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I. INTRODUCTION
Gloria Steinem, when invited to assess the impact of the women's
movement, once responded that it felt like being asked to "describe the universe
and give three examples." Questions about feminism's effects on the law draw
similar responses. That was, however, the issue I was asked to address in
commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of coeducation at Yale College.1
Although it would be impolite to ignore that topic, I cannot resist reformulating
it slightly. What seems equally important is how feminism has not yet affected
law and legal practice. To conclude on a more celebratory note, we should also
consider how feminism, if given fuller expression, could affect law and legal
practice.
As is often the case, the way a question is framed substantially changes the
narrative that history records. Asking about the impact of feminism typically
yields an uplifting account of Pilgrim's Progress, which stresses the dramatic
changes in legal institutions and ideologies over the last two decades. Asking
about the lack of impact evokes a competing myth of Sisyphus, which recites
research on occupational inequality, income disparities, and sexual violence,
and concludes that too many of us are still pushing the same rock up the same
hill.
In some sense, the theme of this symposium testifies to the progress we
have made. Such topics were not raised in polite company while I was in law
school. Yale offered no course in sex discrimination, and when I first indicated
1. This Essay grows out of a symposium sponsored by the Women's Studies Program as part of Yale's
commemorative series. Catharine MacKinnon, Martha Minow, and I were invited to speak in February 1990
concerning "How Feminism Has Affected Law and Legal Practice."
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interest in teaching such a course at Stanford, the Dean was horrified. Not only
was it a field he diplomatically described as "mush," but it would "brand me
as a woman." "Well," I responded with what I hoped was faint irony, "it
probably won't come as a surprise to most of the world. And what, after all,
is my alternative?" But to the Dean, the issue was academic credibility. And
to establish that, I needed a "real" subject; he suggested negotiable instruments.
Credibilitywe have begun to acquire, but the social problems that prompted
my concern are still with us. Despite substantial progress on gender issues over
the last century, we remain stuck in similar places. Sexual violence remains
common, and reproductive freedom is by no means secure.2 Women are
dramatically underrepresented in the highest positions of social, economic, and
political power, and dramatically overrepresented in the lowest positions. Over
85% of all elected officeholders are male; two-thirds of indigent adults are fe-
male.3 The work force remains highly gender segregated and gender stratified,
with women of color at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Full-time fe-
male employees earn less than two-thirds of the annual wages of male workers,
and a Black female college graduate on the average earns no more than a white
male high school dropout.4
Whatever our progress in encouraging women to pursue traditional male
roles, we have been less effective in encouraging men to assume traditional
female ones. Women continue to shoulder the vast majority of responsibilities
in the home, which limits their opportunities in the world outside it.'
Divorce law reform promised equal or equitable treatment between the spouses;
in practice it continues to offer neither. Divorced women have a far greater
2. For example, it is estimated that 20-30% of all women will experience a violent assault outside of
marriage. See surveys in S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 15-18 (1987). An almost equally large number will be
beaten by men with whom they are intimately involved. See surveys discussed in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
ON WIFE ABUSE (K. Yllo & M. Bograd eds. 1988) (25-50%); Waits, The Criminal Justice System'srResponse
to Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 273 (1985) (20%).
For curtailments on reproductive freedom, see, for example, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109
S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Jefferson,
Reproductive Laws, Women of Color and Low-Income Women, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990'S
(S. Cohen & N. Taub eds. 1988).
3. See CENTER FOR AM. WOMAN & POLITICS, WOMEN IN ELECTIVE OFFICE 1989: FACT SHEET (1989)
(in 1989 women held 5% of federal elective offices, 14% of state executive elective offices, 17% of state
legislative seats, and 9% of county governing board positions); D. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 2 (1989);
D. Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: A Second Look (paper presented to American Soc. Ass'n Meetings,
San Francisco, CA, Aug. 1989) (available from Institute for Women's Policy Research).
4. NATIONAL COMM. ON PAY EQUITY, BRIEFING PAPER ON THE WAGE GAP (Briefing Paper No. 1,
Apr. 1989) [hereinafter THE WAGE GAP]; P. ROTHENBERG, RACISM AND SEXISM: AN INTEGRATED STUDY
69-71 (1988); WOMEN's WORK FORCE NETWORK OF WIDER OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN, NATIONAL
COMM'N ON WORKING WOMEN, Overview of Women and Work, in WOMEN AT WORK, FACT SHEET (Winter
1990); NLRB Unveils Revised Set of Health Care Unit Rules, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170, at A-5 (Sept.
1, 1988) (reviewing comparative salary data for college-educated women and male high school dropouts);
Pearce, On the Edge: Marginal Women Workers and Employment Policy, in INGREDIENTS FOR WOMEN'S
EMPLOYMENT POLICY 197 (1987) [collection as whole hereinafter INGREDIENTS]; see also infra text
accompanying notes 164-65.
5. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
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share of caretaking responsibilities and far fewer resources with which to
discharge them.6
The law offers least to those who need it most. An increasing feminization
of poverty has sharpened class divisions, and racial subordination remains
pronounced.7 Many of the rights that the women's movement has struggled
hardest to achieve in education, employment, and reproductive choice are
available only to those who can afford to exercise them. Yet despite these
patterns, the majority of women are unwilling to identify themselves as femi-
nists.8 Most individuals, including those who support the basic objectives of
the women's movement, decline to press them publicly, give them priority
politically, or underwrite them financially.9
For feminists, a central problem remains the lack of social consensus that
there is in fact a problem. To the public in general, and lawmakers in particular,
sex-based disparities have often appeared natural, functional, and, in large
measure, unalterable. A related problem is that many individuals who do
perceive sex-based disparities as a problem conceive it too narrowly. Too much
faith is placed in formal equality while too few strategies focus on the forces
constraining it. Too often women are treated as a homogeneous group; too
seldom does attention focus on the intersection of gender with other patterns
of subordination such as class, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.
6. L WErIZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 260-61, 355 (1985); Rhode & Minow, Reforming the
Questions, Questioning the Reforms: Feminist Perspectives on Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE
CROSSROADS 191 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990).
7. On poverty, see M. KArZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR
ON WELFARE 242-44 (1989); D. Pearce, supra note 3. On racial deprivation, see, for example, A COMMON
DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOcmTY 3-6, 16-21, 282-87, 291-99 (G. Jaynes & R. Williams eds.
1989); P. ROTHENBERG, supra note 4; SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: THE STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN
293-94 (M. Simms & J. Malveaux eds. 1986); Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Figart, Hartmann, Hoytt &
Outtz, The Wage Gap and Women of Color, 1989 WOMEN'S POL'Y RES. CONF. PROC. 25 (available from
Institute for Women's Policy Research); McAdoo, A Portrait of African American Families in the United
States, in THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1990-1991: A STATUS REPORT 71 (S. Rix ed. 1990) [collection as whole
hereinafter THE AMERICAN WOMAN].
8. For the "I'm Not a Feminist But" phenomenon, see, for example, Wallis, Onward Women!, TIME,
Dec. 4, 1989, at 80, 85 (33% of women interviewed considered themselves to be feminist; 58% did not);
Wickenden, What "NOW?," NEW REPUBLIC, May 5,1986, at 19; Fleming, The American Wife, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 26, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 29.
9. See J. CHAFESZ, GENDER EQUITY: AN INTEGRATED THEORY OF STABILITY AND CHANGE 169-70
(1990) (women's movement even at maximum size has included only about 3% of population; no significant
"gender gap" in political preferences is apparent on gender equity issues); C. EPSTEIN, DECEPTIVE
DISTINCTIONS: SEX, GENDER, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 185 (1988) (one-third of women in Congress do
not belong to Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues); A. MORRISON, R. WHITE & E. VAN VELSOR,
BREAKING THE GLASS CEILING: CAN WOMEN REACH THE TOP OF AMERICA'S CORPORATIONS? 38-39 (1987)
(discussing taboo on raising women's issues); WOMEN AND FOUNDATIONS/CORPORATE PHILANTHROPHY,
FAR FROM DONE: THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND GIRLS IN AMERICA, at i (1988) (programs for women and
girls account for 3.4% of foundation funding); Krier, Power: They Want it Now, L.A. Times, July 2, 1990,
at El, col. 6 (reporting that National Organization for Women has 260,000 members); Hume, Women
Politicians Are Backing Away from Feminist Labels to Expand Base of Support, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 1985,
at 62, col. 1 (discussing female politicians' unwillingness to identify themselves as feminists); infra note
212.
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This narrow conception of the problem reinforces attitudes that deny its
existence. The achievement of individual rights fortifies the illusion that
collective problems have been resolved. Whatever sex-based differences remain
are frequently attributed to women's different "voice" and different choices."0
For most Americans, gender inequality is not a serious problem, or it is not
their problem.
The following discussion reformulates this perception as the problem. By
situating rationalizations for sex-based inequality within a broader historical,
socioeconomic, and psychological context, these comments explore the relation-
ship between legal ideology and feminist strategies.
Denials of a "woman problem" assume several forms that parallel other
accounts of group-based subordination such as class and race." The most
traditional approach has been to acknowledge gender disparities, but to deny
their injustice. Under this view, sexual subordination reflects biological, reli-
gious, and cultural imperatives. A related strategy has been to deny that signifi-
cant gender inequalities exist. This framework either celebrates or devalues
gender differences; it affirms sex-linked roles as separate but equal, or, alterna-
tively, denies the need for any accommodation of sex-linked attributes or
experiences. A third approach is to concede the existence of sex-based injust-
ices, but to deny responsibility for causing or remedying them. Adherents of
this view embrace gender equality in principle while evading it in practice; they
proclaim support for feminist objectives but dismiss feminist initiatives as
unworkable, unaffordable, or someone else's obligation. Such strategies fre-
quently victimize the victim. It is widely assumed, often by women themselves,
that they deserve the subordination they experience, or that they must find
individual solutions for shared dilemmas. As a result, the political remains only
personal, and self-transformation masquerades as a substitute for social transfor-
mation.
The following discussion explores legal norms that reflect and reinforce
these ideologies of denial as well as the feminist challenge that they present.
By focusing on how gender inequality is discounted, dismissed, or deflected,
we may gain a better sense of how it can be addressed.
As a threshold matter, it may be helpful to clarify terms. Although defi-
nitions of feminism vary, most incorporate two basic dimensions. At the
substantive level, feminism implies a commitment to equality between the
10. The phrase is from C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's
DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1982). For critical responses to this use of Gilligan's work, see infra text accompanying
notes 269, 272 & 278.
11. On issues of race, see, for example, Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412-35 (1989) (discussing "stock stories" that enable members of
racial majorities to see their position as natural or deserved). On issues of class, see M. KATZ, supra note
7, at 5-15, 67-69 (discussing how hardships of poverty are understated or attributed to individual laziness
and vice); F. PARKIN, CLAsS INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL ORDER: SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN CAPITALIST
AND COM^NST SOCIETIEs 62-77 (1971) (analyzing how individuals' choices of reference groups and
assumptions about meritocracy legitimate class structures).
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sexes. At the methodological level, it implies a commitment to gender as a
focus of concern and to analytic approaches that reflect women's concrete
experience. Underlying these commitments are certain core values of broader
scope. Any ethical framework adequate to challenge gender subordination must
similarly condemn the other patterns of injustice with which it intersects. Any
political strategy responsive to the concerns of all women must, by definition,
speak to inequalities not only of gender but also of class, race, ethnicity, age,
and sexual orientation. A recurrent limitation of the women's movement has
been its own denial of these wider dimensions of the "woman problem." The
challenge for contemporary feminists is to build support for the broader social
initiatives that the problem in fact requires. To realize its full potential, femi-
nism must seek not only equal status for all women, but equal recognition for
the values traditionally associated with them.
The discussion that follows includes particular attention to women's experi-
ences at Yale and in the legal profession, both because this Essay marks a
commemorative occasion for Yale University and because these experiences
reflect broader cultural trends. Most versions of the "no-problem problem" have
had their season in academic and professional circles. And for me, these
contexts hold particular resonance since I came to Yale as an undergraduate
in 1970, the second year of coeducation, remained through law school, and have
returned intermittently as a legal scholar and trustee. By exploring ideologies
of denial in academic and professional settings, the following analysis under-
scores some political implications of personal experience.
The paper's organizing theme is autobiographical in another sense. The "no-
problem" ideology expresses variations on the most common response I have
encountered over the last decade in teaching and writing about women's issues
as well as in administering an institute that sponsors such work. Much of the
time, the topic is greeted with polite skepticism, mild discomfort, or rhetorical
questions. Of all the "important" social problems, why should attention focus
on women, who, after all, have made such progress over the last quarter-
century? To the extent that inequalities remain, does the solution really lie with
more or different legal strategies? Aren't the remaining barriers primarily due
to social forces beyond the scope of formal policy?
In responding to these questions, this Essay draws on a larger debate about
the relationship between legal norms and gender hierarchies. The law provides
a crucial structure in which ideologies of denial are reflected and renegotiated.
By looking at how legal decisionmakers look at gender, we may gain a clearer
sense of how social inequalities are discounted, legitimated, and ultimately
resisted.
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II. THE DENIAL OF INJUSTICE
A. The Historical Legacy
1. Traditional Assumptions
Most people share what social psychologists have labeled a "belief in a just
world."12 Individuals generally want to believe that life follows orderly, pre-
dictable, and equitable patterns in which everyone gets what they deserve and
deserves what they get. To sustain this view, people will often adjust their
evaluations of merit to justify existing social arrangements.13
Historically, the most common justification for sex-based disparities has
been sex-based difference. Until the mid-nineteenth century, virtually all major
political, philosophical, and theological frameworks relegated women to a
separate and distinctly subordinate sphere. 4 The prevailing assumption was
that gender inequalities were biologically grounded, spiritually ordained, and
culturally essential.
Scientific "wisdom" reinforced sex-based hierarchies. According to leading
nineteenth-century experts such as Gustave le Bon, women's inferiority to men
was "so obvious [that] . . . only its degree [was] worth discussion." 5 The
female's brain was too light, her forehead too small, her powers of reasoning
too inadequate for demanding educational or occupational pursuits.16 Promi-
nent medical authorities warned women about the deadly brain/womb conflict;
those who diverted scarce biological resources from reproductive to cognitive
functions risked chronic disabilities and permanent sterility. To tempt women
from the proper duties of their sex risked deforming, defeminizing, and possibly
depleting America's superior breeding stock. 7
12. M. LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION, at vii-viii (1980).
13. Id. at 50-53. See generally F. HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1959);
ApsIer & Friedman, Chance Outcomes and the Just World: A Comparison of Observers and Recipients,
31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 887 (1975); Brewer, An Information Processing Approach to
Attribution ofResponsibility, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 58 (1977); Comer & Laird, Choosing
to Suffer as a Consequence of Expecting to Suffer: Why Do People Do It?, 32 L PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOLOGY 92 (1975); Deaux, Sex: A Perspective on the Attributive Process, in 1 NEW DIRECTIONS IN
ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 335,339 (1976); Kelley, The Process of CasualAttribution, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
107 (1973); infra text accompanying notes 220-23.
14. See generally S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLmCAL THOUGHT (1979); C. PATEMAN, THE DISOR-
DER OF WOMEN: DEMOCRACY, FEMINISM AND POLITICAL THEORY (1989).
15. As quoted in J. GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 104-05 (1981); see also W. KAMINER, A
FEARFUL FREEDOM: WOMEN'S FLIGHT FROM EQUALITY, at xiii-10, 41 (1990); C. RUSSETT, SEXUAL
SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CONSTRUCTION OF WOMANHOOD (1989).
16. J. GOULD, supra note 15, at 103-07; 2 T. WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 346 (1929); Hyde, Meta-Analysis and the Psychology of Gender Differences, 16 SIGNS 55,
56-57 (1990); Maudsley, Sex in Mind and in Education, in MEN'S IDEASJWOMEN'S REALITIES 77-86 (L.
Newman ed. 1985).
17. E. CLARK, SEX IN EDUCATION: OR, A FAIR CHANCE FOR Gus 104, 137 (1873) (discussing the
"sterilizing" and "derangfing]" effects of "excessive brain activity"); B. HARRIS, BEYOND HER SPHERE:
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONS AND AMERICAN HISTORY 40-41,58 (1978); C. SMIH-ROSENBERG, DISORDER-
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Gender inequality was assumed to be a cultural as well as biological
imperative. For women to enter commercial and political life would mean
"homes... ruined, children neglected" and civilized society imperiled. 18 Since
most educators believed that female instruction should be tailored to female
roles, sex-based exclusions appeared appropriate for universities like Yale. John
Trumbull captured traditional prejudices in late eighteenth-century verse:
Why should girls be learn'd and wise?
Books only serve to spoil their eyes.
The studious eye but faintly twinkles
And reading paves the way to wrinkles. 19
2. Legal Norms
American law reflected and reinforced these societal assumptions. It offered
no recourse against the norms that barred women from political participation
and restricted their opportunities for paid labor.20 Under traditional common-
law doctrines, wives had no right to hold, acquire, or convey property, retain
their own wages, enter into contracts, or initiate legal claims.21
Underpinning these restrictions was an ideology of gender difference that
institutionalized gender subordination. Judicial decisions upholding women's
exclusion from the bar are a case in point. Female applicants' "peculiar quali-
ties" were exaggerated and essentialized. 2 State and federal supreme court
justices discerned a law of "nature and the Creator" which decreed "the domes-
tic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of
womanhood." 23 Although the precise method of divine communication was
never elaborated, its message was often delivered. Woman's nature was to
nurture; her "gentle graces... [and] tender susceptibility" ill suited her to the
rigors of professional life.' Whether law was unfit for women, or women
LY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 258-60 (1985); see also B. EHRENREICH & D.
ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARS OF THE EXPERTS' ADVICE TO WOMEN 109-15 (1978). For
discussion of the class and racial biases underlying these concerns, see sources cited infra note 43.
18. See K. BLAIR, THE CLUBWOMAN AS FEMINIST: TRUE WOMANHOOD DEFINED, 1868-1914, at 34,
70 (1980); see also A. AMES, SEX IN INDUSTRY: A PLEA FOR THE WORKING GIRL 30-31 (1986) (1875);
A. SINCLAIR, THE BETrER HALF: THE EMANCIPATION OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN 323 (1966).
19. As quoted in Kerber, "Why Should Girls Be Learn'd and Wise?": TWo Centuries of Higher
Education for Women as Seen Through the Unfinished Work of Alice Mary Baldwin, in WOMEN AND
HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 18, 21 (J. Faragher & F. Howe eds. 1988).
20. See generally S. ANTHONY & T. HARPER, HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE (1902); E. FLEXNER,
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1975); A.
KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT 1890-1920 (1965); D. RHODE, supra note
3, at 10-19, 24-37, 46-50.
21. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430. See generally WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE SOCIAL
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (D. Weisberg ed. 1982) [hereinafter WOMEN AND THE LAW]; Basch, The Emerging
Legal History of Women in the United States: Property, Divorce, and the Constitution, 12 SIGNS 97 (1986).
22. See In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875).
23. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, L, concurring).
24. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. at 245.
1738 [Vol. 100: 1731
Feminist Challenges
unfit for law, the consequences were the same. Professional pursuits were a
departure from the natural order and "when voluntary, treason against it."'
3. Feminist Responses
In challenging such assumptions, advocates of women's rights followed two
primary approaches. One was to deny the extent or essential nature of sex-based
difference. Marshaling scientific, anthropological, and historical data, feminists
revealed ostensibly biological distinctions as empirically unfounded or culturally
constructed. That process highlighted obvious inconsistencies in gender ideolo-
gy. Why should woman's "gentle graces" and maternal mission bar her from
prestigious professions like law, but not grueling and indelicate occupations
such as field and factory labor, where female immigrant and Black workers
were clustered?'
An alternative strategy involved embracing rather than contesting difference.
Under this approach, woman's distinctive moral attributes became grounds for
including, not excluding, her from public life. For example, advocates for equal
suffrage and equal access to legal institutions appealed not only to natural rights
but also to natural roles. To the extent women were the same as men, they
should enjoy the same opportunities. To the extent women were different, their
special attributes warranted representation in public arenas. Under some circum-
stances, a woman lawyer's "silver voice" might "accomplish more than the
severity and sternness of a man could achieve."27 Female jurors' "elevating
and refining influence" might similarly enhance the quality of justice available
to all citizens3 Given women's moral sensibilities and nurturing values, their
involvement could "purify" politics.29
Following this strategy to its logical conclusion, some feminists also
invoked sex-based differences as a rationale for sex-specific protections. To
these activists, true equality was obtainable only through measures that took
into account the actual biological, social, and occupational differences between
men and women.30 As these feminists noted, female workers during the first
25. Id. at 244; see also In re Kilgore, 17 Phil. 14 (Pa. C. CP14 1884).
26. See generally P. GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE
AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984); J. JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK AND
THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT (1985); A. MIRANDE & E. ENRIQUEZ, LA CHICANA: THE
MEXICAN AMERICAN VoMAN (1979); C. STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEw YORK,
1789-1860 (1986).
27. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 137 (1872) (Carpenter, arguing for plaintiff in error).
28. WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 330 (M. Wortman ed. 1984); see also Garfinkle, Lefcourt & Schulder,
Women's Servitude Under Law, in LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY LAW, ORDER AND
THE COURTS 105-22 (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971).
29. S. ANTHONY & T. HARPER, supra note 20, at 39, 308-09.
30. W. CHAFE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN: HER CHANGING SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL ROLES,
1920-1970, at 127 (1972); Kelly, Should Women Be Treated Identically with Men by the Law?, in SPECIAL
LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN 86, 87 (J. Johnsen ed. 1926). See generally M. ANDERSON, WOMEN AT WORK
(1951).
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part of the century earned lower wages and faced more exploitive working
conditions than their male counterparts. Employment discrimination encouraged
job turnover, which impeded unionization and minimized opportunities for
seniority-based benefits and promotions.31 Not only were women at a competi-
tive disadvantage in the paid labor force, they bore special burdens in the
unpaid one. Household obligations, coupled with ten- to fourteen-hour work
shifts, imposed crushing responsibilities. 32 This double day discouraged mar-
ried women from working and imposed enormous hardship upon those, espe-
cially women of color, who had no alternative to full-time labor.33 Such con-
siderations led feminists to support sex-based maximum-hour and minimum-
wage legislation for female employees that legal decisionmakers were unwilling
to extend to males.34
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, feminism gained
increasing influence. Various factors, including the rise in women's education,
employment, and political activism, apparently left both "nature and the Cre-
ator" with revised positions on gender roles. Struggles for the ballot, for
married women's property rights, for protective labor legislation, for access to
the professions, and for related entitlements helped transform the legal land-
scape.
35
Yet with victory also came defeats. The ambivalence about difference
carried a cost. Claims about women's superior qualities risked sentimentalizing
and overstating their influence. Recognition of sex-based disadvantages in some
measure perpetuated them. To be sure, sex-based protective legislation did bring
crucial improvements for the majority of women crowded into predominantly
female occupations. 36 But as some feminists noted, the price was increased
female unemployment and competitive disadvantage in occupations where male
31. A. KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED (1981); R. SMUTS, WOMEN AND WORK
IN AMERICA 85 (1959); Baker, Protective Labor Legislation, with Special Reference to Women in the State
of New York, 116 STUD. HIST., ECON. & PUB. L. 207-10 (1925). See generally DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (I. Commons ed. 1909-10); 1 P. FONER, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT 256-69 (1979).
32. See Baker, supra note 31, at 186-88,207; De Hart-Mathews, The New Feminism and the Dynamics
of Social Change, in WOMEN'S AMERICA: REFOCUSING THE PAST 437, 440 (L. Kerber & J. De Hart-
Mathews eds. 2d ed. 1987). For historical support see generally A. KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A
HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES (1982).
33. D. KATZMAN, SEVEN DAYS A WEEK: WOMEN AND DOMESTIC SERVICE IN INDUSTRIALIZING
AMERICA 95-145 (1978); Blanshard, How to Live on Forty-six Cents a Day, NATION, May 15, 1929, at 530,
reprinted in THE FEMALE EXPERIENCE: AN AMERICAN DOCUMENTARY 290 (G. Lerner ed. 1977); Glenn,
Racial Ethnic Women's Labor: The Intersection ofRace, Gender and Class Oppression, REV. RADICAL POL.
ECON., Fall 1985, at 86, 92-100.
34. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) with Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
35. See generally W. CHAFE, supra note 30; C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT (1980); S. EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF
WORKING WOMEN IN AMERICA (1989); E. FLEXNER, supra note 20; D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 24-26; N.
WOLOCH, WOMEN AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1984).
36. See Baker, supra note 31, at 351-53. See generally U.S. WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
BULL. No. 65, THE EFFECTS OF LABOR LEGISLATION ON THE EMPLOYMENT OPPORUNrTIES OF WOMEN
43-53 (1928) (discussion of various protective laws).
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workers were available. By lobbying for legal protections against women on
night or overtime shifts, male-dominated unions were often able to "protect"
women out of the most attractive positions.37 Such statutes foreclosed occupa-
tional mobility and locked women into crowded, sex-segregated employment,
which further diminished their bargaining leverage. 8 Protective ideology based
on women's "special needs and vulnerabilities" also spilled over to other gender
discrimination contexts in which protection was less desirable, such as jury
service or criminal sentencing and juvenile delinquency statutes.39
Not all of these consequences were plainly foreseeable or readily
quantifiable by those who supported gender-specific regulation. In retrospect,
it is by no means clear whether women gained or lost more through such
initiatives. Much depends on which women and which historical periods are
emphasized and what tradeoffs are made between economic and noneconomic
factors. What is clear, however, is that disputes over difference did carry a
substantial political cost. The issue of special treatment divided the fragile
postsuffrage women's movement, part of which supported a constitutional equal
rights amendment and part of which opposed any measure that would jeopar-
dize sex-specific protections. 40 As a consequence, many early twentieth-centu-
ry feminists ended up fighting each other over the value of protection rather
than uniting to challenge the conditions that made protection so necessary.
A second limitation in the early feminist campaign lay in its denial of the
scope of the problem. To broaden their political appeal, activists increasingly
narrowed their social vision. As the struggle for suffrage escalated, leaders of
the organized women's movement focused ever more singlemindedly on the
ballot and appealed to class, racial, and ethnic prejudices in seeking support.
Female enfranchisement, it was often claimed, would be a bulwark against the
37. Equal Rights: Hearings on S.J. Res. 52 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 71st
Cong., 3d Sess. 1, 20 (1931) (in assessing negative impact of protective labor laws and fighting for early
proposed equal rights amendment the National Women's Party argued that the amendment should "require
that all industrial laws be based upon the nature of the work and not upon the sex of the worker"); J. BAER,
THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN's LABOR LEGISLATION 31-32 (1978);
S. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM BETWEEN THE WARS
144-47 (1981); A. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 32, at 201-14; S. LEHRER, ORIGINS OF PROTECTIVE
LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN 228-33 (1987); Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial
Assaults on Feminist Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1518, 1520 (1986).
38. See sources cited in Rhode, Definitions of Difference, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL
DIFFERENCE 197,206-07 (D. Rhode ed. 1990) [collection as whole hereinafter THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES].
39. For examples of women's exclusion from jury service, see Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-65
(1961); Bailey v. State, 215 Ark. 53, 60-64, 219 S.W.2d 424,428-29 (1949); State v. Kelley, 39 Idaho 668,
673-76, 229 P. 659, 661-62 (1924); Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 410-11, 177 N.E. 656,
662 (1931). For criminal sentencing provisions that disadvantage women, see Exparte Gosselin, 141 Me.
412, 421-22, 44 A.2d 882, 885-86 (1945). For discussion of juvenile delinquency provisions that treated
female adolescents more harshly than males, see, for example, ABA, LITILE SISTERS AND THE LAW (1977);
Moulds, Women's Crime, Women's Justice, in WOMEN, POWER, AND POLICY 205, 221-23 (E. Boneparth
ed. 1982).
40. See D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 34-37. See generally S. BECKER, supra note 37; S. WARE, BEYOND
SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN THE NEW DEAL (1981) [hereinafter BEYOND SUFFRAGE]; Olsen, supra note 37.
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"brutish and ignorant Negro."4 Even after passage of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, when Black women demanded that America's major feminist organiza-
tion, the National Women's Party, protest the denial of their voting rights in
the South, the NWP refused on the grounds that this was a "'race issue,' not
a 'woman's issue."' 42 Many white feminists who challenged assumptions
about the inherent inferiority of women accepted analogous and equally unsup-
ported premises about the deficiencies of the lower classes or of racial and
ethnic minorities. For most activists, inequalities apart from gender were not
a serious problem or not their problem.43
Feminists' focus on formal rights also deflected attention from the broader
social and economic structure that constrained their exercise. Movement leaders
demanded equal opportunity for women but did not envision the transformation
of gender roles necessary to secure it. Although activists helped expand female
participation in the public sphere, they failed to challenge the allocation of
power and responsibilities in the domestic sphere. 44 Nor did they focus on a
range of other issues that were most crucial to those women most in
need-welfare, racism, sexual violence, divorce, and birth control.45
Of course, to have encompassed more divisive issues risked compromising
support, diluting energies, and delaying the struggle for entitlements. But the
price may have been higher than many women's rights advocates realized. By
narrowing their definition of the problem, leaders of the early feminist move-
ment laid foundations for its decline. Once the greatest formal disabilities had
been removed, talk of emancipation and entitlements began to seem "stale
stuff," a preoccupation of unfeminine "frumps" in "nondescript tweeds" who
"antagonized men with their constant clamor about women's place." 46 More-
41. R. FONER, FREDERICK DOUGLASS ON WOMAN'S RIGHTS 30 (1976); see also B. HOOKS, AIN'T I
A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 130-31 (1981); G. LERNER, THE MAJORITY FINDS ITS PAST:
PLACING WOMEN IN HISTORY 34 (1979).
42. S. EVANS, supra note 35, at 187 (quoting Alice Paul); P. GIDDINGS, supra note 26, at 166-69.
43. For reviews of feminist leaders' class and racial bias, see, for example, S. EVANS, supra note 35,
at 18; P. GmDINGS, supra note 26, at 127-29; B. HOOKS, supra note 41, at 161-65; A. KRADITOR, supra
note 20, at 141. See generally R. FONER, supra note 41; G. LERNER, supra note 41.
44. Virtually no leading nineteenth-century feminist argued that women should cease to be the primary
caretakers of home and family, nor did early activists envision changes in workplace structures, male roles,
and reproductive choices that would enable wives to accommcdate public and domestic life. See C. DEGLER,
supra note 35, at 345-46; D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 13-14; Blackwell, Relation of Woman's Work in the
Household to the World Outside, in UP FROM THE PEDESTAL: SELECTED WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FEMINISM 150-59 (A. Kraditor ed. 1968) (proposing that women defer nondomestic achievement
until age fifty at which point every vocation, including presidency, should be available to them).
45. For analysis of family violence around the turn of the century, see L. GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR
OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 2-3 (1988). For discussion of early feminist
views toward birth control, see 3. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
NATIONAL POLICY, 1800-1900, at 111 (1978); 3. REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE: THE BIRTH
CONTROL MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 33 (1978). For issues of racism, see supra note 43. For
an overview of other issues, see sources cited in D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 16-17.
46. E. SHOWALTER, THESE MODERN WOMEN: AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL ESSAYS FROM THE TWENTIES 8
(1978); G. PERRETr, AMERICA IN THE TWENTIES 158 (1982); Bromley, Feminists-New Style, HARPER'S
MONTHLY MAG., OcL 1927, at 552; De Ford, The Feminist Future, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 19, 1928,
at 121-23.
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over, the faith in formal entitlements obscured their practical limitations. For
example, statutes granting married women equal property rights were subject
to qualifications that preserved male control over family assets and reinforced
traditional stereotypes about female roles.4 7 Since few married women had
independent sources of income, property law reforms did little to reduce wives'
economic dependence. Nor did sex-specific protective statutes offer adequate
protection in practice. Enforcement was limited, minimum-wage requirements
were set below subsistence levels, and employer exemptions were available for
occupations such as domestic service and farm labor where exploitation was
common and women of color were concentrated.
4 8
The achievement of formal entitlements also had little effect on many
informal barriers. 49 For example, long after the elimination of sex-based ad-
mission criteria for the professions, socialization patterns, employer biases, and
academic policies severely restricted the number of women, particularly women
of color ° Yale practices were typical. In 1886, its law school admitted its
first woman-by mistake. When university administrators discovered that "A.B.
Jordan" was female, they permitted her enrollment but adjusted the application
form to prevent further embarrassment.5 1 Administrators at other institutions
worried that the "clack of these possible Portias" would distract men and
"unsex" women. 2 Throughout their first century at the bar, women never
exceeded 3-5% of the profession and were largely relegated to the lowest status
47. Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U.L. REV. 28, 37-39 (1935); Johnston, Sex and Property: The
Common Law Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1033, 1070-89 (1972). See generally N. BASCH, IN THE EYES OFTHE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND
PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982); Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-
1850, 71 GEO. L.J 1359 (1983); Speth, The Married Women's Property Acts 1839-1865: Reform, Reaction,
or Revolution?, in 2 WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 21, at 69.
48. J. BAER, supra note 37, at 31-32; L. SCHARF, To WORK AND TO WED: FEMALE EMPLOYMENT,
FEMINISM, AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 114, 116 (1980); Note, Regulation of Conditions of Employment
of Women: A Critique of Muller v. Oregon, 13 B.U.L. REv. 276, 289-90 (1933).
49. B. Lockwood, My Efforts to Become a Lawyer, in WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1675 TO 1929, at 297-98 (W. Brownlee & M. Brownlee eds. 1976). Throughout
the first half of the twentieth century, women never constituted more than about 7% of any of the elite
professions. B. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 137-39; Degler, Revolution Without Ideology: The Changing Place
of Women in America, in THE WOMAN IN AMERICA 193, 201 (R. Lifton ed. 1965). For other statistics on
women's underrepresentation in public life during in the first half of the century, see E. FLEXNER, supra
note 20, at 325; B. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 156; J. POLE, THE PURSUIT OF EQUALITY IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 311 (1978). See generally sources cited supra note 35. For statistics on women of color, see
generally G. SEGAL, BLACKS IN THE LAW (1983); A. MIRANDE & E. ENRIQUEZ, supra note 26; K.
MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA: 1638 TO THE PRESENT 143-73 (1986);
Parker & Stebman, Legal Education for Blacks, ANNALS, May 1973, at 144.
50. K. MORELLO, supra note 49, at 3-39; see also R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S, at 82-84 (1983); Bittenbender, Woman in Law, in WOMAN'S
WORK IN AMERICA 220-44 (A. Meyer ed. 1972). On barriers confronting women of color, see K. MORELLO,
supra note 49, at 143-73; G. SEGAL, supra note 49; Parker & Stebman, supra note 49.
51. Schiff, Old Yale: The Earliest Women, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Dec. 1989.
52. See sources cited in Rhode, supra note 38, at 206-07 n.37; supra note 50.
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areas of practice.13 Not until 1972 did all bar-accredited law schools admit
female students. 4
These limitations in the early women's movement should not, however,
obscure its contributions. For the first time, feminists made gender inequality
a social problem demanding political recognition and legal reform. As a
consequence, women gained rights essential to contest their subordinate status.
Yet for the next half-century, they failed to exercise those rights in ways that
would materially improve their lives. For the most part, women neither orga-
nized around women's issues nor confronted the ideology of difference that
made such organization necessary 5 The limitations, as well as the accom-
plishments, of early feminist struggles hold lessons for their contemporary
counterparts.
B. Contemporary Frameworks
1. The Cultural Context
By the 1960's, traditional gender roles were growing increasingly out of
step with socioeconomic, demographic, and technological forces. After the
postwar baby boom, the development of effective oral contraceptives con-
tributed to a longstanding decline in birth rates. This decline, coupled with the
rise in women's life expectancy, meant that the average mother could anticipate
spending about two-thirds of her adult years with no children under the age of
eighteen 6 Marriage, like motherhood, was also becoming a less stable foun-
dation on which to build an entire life. At the turn of the century, one in 500
marriages ended in divorce; by the 1960's, the ratio was about one in three,
and current estimates are one in two.57
53. C. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW 49-94 (1981); B. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 108-09, 138; Rhode,
Perspectives on Professional Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1173-74 (1988).
54. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 50-55; B. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 108-09, 138; Fossum, Women
in the Legal Profession: A Progress Report, 67 WOMEN LAW. J. 1, 1 (1981).
55. See generally W. CHAFE, supra note 30; N. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM (1987);
C. DEGLEP, supra note 35. Women did, however, make some important gains through social welfare activity
and increased representation in political positions. BEYOND SUFFRAGE, supra note 40; S. WARE, HOLDING
THEIR OWN: AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE 1930S (1982); Stricker, Cookbooks and Law Books: The Hidden
History of Career Women in Twentieth-Century America, in A HERrAGE OF HER OWN: TOWARD A NEW
SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 476, 479 (N.Cott & E. Pleck eds. 1979).
56. 3. BARDWICK, IN TRANSITION: How FEMINISM, SEXUAL LIBERATION, AND THE SEARCH FOR SELF-
FULFILLMENT HAVE ALTERED OUR LIVEs 65 (1979); see also AMERICAN WOMEN: REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 4-7 (1963) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION]; E. KLEIN, GENDER POLITICS 66-67 (1984); M. RYAN, WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA: FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 279-80 (1983); G. YATES, WHAT WOMEN WANT: THE IDEAS OF THE
MOVEMENT 155 (1975) (quoting A. Rossi, Family Development in a Changing World (paper presented at
the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association (May 5, 1970))).
57. See J. BARDWICK, supra note 56, at 100; A. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 21-25
(1981); G. MASNICK & M. BANE, THE NATION'S FAMILIES 1960-1990, at 31-37 (1980).
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This escalating divorce rate, coupled with a rise in nonmarital childbirth,
increased women's need for economic independence and paid employment.
High inflation and rising expectations in living standards also encouraged more
women to enter the labor force for longer periods. 58 This trend was not with-
out precedent; many women of color had always worked and World War II had
brought a substantial percentage of white women into the paid labor force.59
But the growth in female employment beginning in the 1960's was more
widespread and sustained. As increasing numbers of women workers encoun-
tered gender-based restrictions, the foundations for feminist activity grew
stronger.
These structural forces both responded and contributed to changes in the
ideological climate. During the 1960's and early 1970's, the growth in pro-
gressive political movements, and the discrimination that women experienced
within them, fueled demands for a broader transformation of gender roles.'
So too, the frustrations of many middle-class housewives, trapped in menial
tasks and vicarious relationships, found expression in feminist publications and
discussion groups. What Betty Friedan labeled "the problem that has no name"
began to gain recognition. 61 In less than a decade, the women's movement
transformed "personal" issues into political causes and reconceptualized individ-
ual grievances as social injustices.
Over the next quarter-century, feminist strategies sought to change con-
sciousness and change laws. Legal efforts focused on expanding reproductive
freedom, deterring sexual abuse, and eliminating sex-based discrimination in
employment, education, family, welfare, and related contexts. The objective was
to challenge unequal opportunities and the ideology that had legitimated them.
Such efforts, like those of the first feminist campaign, have resulted in
partial progress. Women have increasingly secured equality in formal rights,
but as noted earlier, they still experience substantial inequalities in social,
economic, and political status. The persistence of such disparities is in part
attributable to the continuing devaluation of women's capabilities and women's
work. Such devaluation is most obvious in New Right ideology and sociobiolo-
58. J. GIELE, WOMEN AND THE FUTURE: CHANGING SEX ROLES IN MODERN AMERICA 92 (1978);
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 56, at 58-60; M. RYAN, supra note 56, at 280; Bird,
The Androgynous Life, in VoicEs OF THE NEW FEMINISM 178, 190-98 (M. Thompson ed. 1970). This is
not to imply that escalating divorce rates were the preeminent cause of women's increased labor force
participation. For many women, increased access to paid employment made divorce possible.
59. J. JONES, supra note 26; V. OPPENHEIMER, THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE IN THE U.S. (1970); W.
WANDERSEE, WOMEN'S WORK AND FAMILY VALUES, 1920-1940 (1981); N. WOLOCH, supra note 35, at
505-08.
60. For descriptions of sex-based subordination in civil rights, antiwar, and other left groups, see S.
EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WoMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND
THE NEW LEFT (1979); J. HOLE & E. LEVINE, REBIRTH OF FEMINISM (1971).
61. B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 15 (1983) (1963); see also L CHAFMrz, supra note 9, at
163-70 (describing how macrostructural changes open opportunities for women that create role conflicts,
encourage a sense of relative deprivation, and increase gender consciousness).
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gical theory, but it also appears in less explicit or conscious forms in a broad
array of other contexts.
2. Conservative Ideology: Religious and Sociobiological Premises
As was true a century earlier, nature and the Creator figure prominently in
conservative justifications of sex-based inequality. Both biology and theology
continue to frame debates over a range of legal issues involving abortion,
employment, welfare and family policy, gay/lesbian rights, and a proposed
constitutional Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).
For example, opposition to the Amendment drew heavily on Fundamentalist
and Catholic constituencies, which viewed gender equality as inconsistent with
scriptural authority. As one Montana legislator informed his colleagues, if God
"had wanted women to be equal, He would have had six female apostles." 62
According to Phyllis Schlafly, leader of the anti-ERA campaign, the "Divine
Architect" created fundamental biological differences between the sexes, from
which fundamental social inequalities necessarily follow.63 By her reasoning,
"[w]omen have babies, so men should support them." To New Right leaders,
it generally seems self-evident that "most women would rather cuddle a baby
than a typewriter or factory machine" and are willing to place family over
career.65 Under this view, the centrality of the male's breadwinning role justi-
fies his dominance in both work and family settings.66
Other conservative leaders, while less explicit about sex-based hierarchies,
generally endorse the role division underlying them. Pope John Paul I's 1988
62. J. BOLES, THE POLITICS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: CONFLICT AND THE DECISION
PROCESS 6 (1979); see also A. DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 117 (1983) (describing views of Christian
woman from Mississippi on ERA); O'Reilly, Every Woman Has Become Feminist in Her Own Way, Chi.
Tribune, June 27, 1982, § 2, at I, col. 3. In a more recent example of similar logic, Bob Knepper, Houston
Astros pitcher, objected to women umpires on the grounds that "[tihis is not an occupation women should
be in. In God's society, woman was created in the role of submission to the husband. It's not that woman
is inferior, but I don't believe women should be in a leadership role." Lieber, Some Say No Leica, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, June 20, 1988, at 48.
For accounts of ERA opposition by religious groups, see P. CONOVER & V. GRAY, FEMINISM AND
THE NEW RIGHT: CONFLICT OVER THE AMERICAN FAMILY (1983); Brady & Tedin, Ladies in Pink: Religion
and Political Ideology in the Anti-ERA Movement, 56 Soc. Sc. Q. 564, 573-75 (1976); Rhode, EqualRights
in Retrospect, I J.L. & INEQUALrrY 1, 36-37 (1983); Swidler, Catholics and the E.R.A., 103 COMMONWEAL
585 (1976).
63. P. SCHLAFLY, THE POWER OF THE POSITIVE WOMAN 12-17 (1977).
64. Loercher, Equality for Women Stalled?, Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 15, 1973, at 6, col. 2 (quoting
Schlafly).
65. P. SCHLAFLY, supra note 63, at 51-52; see also R. KLATCH, WOMEN OF THE NEW RIGHT 191
(1987) (quoting one conservative woman's assumption that "very few people have ajob more pleasant than
taking care of their own children"); infra note 123.
66. Since a family "cannot be run by committee," it needs an "ultimate decisionmaker, and that is the
husband." P. SC-LAFLY, supra note 63, at 50; see also S. ALI, THE BLACKMAN'S GUIDE TO UNDERSTAND-
ING THE BLACKWOMAN (1990); R. KLATCH, supra note 65, at 146 (quoting C. MARSHNER, THE NEW
TRADITIONAL WOMAN 6 (Free Congress Res. & Educ. Found. ed. 1982)).
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Apostolic Letter echoed traditional nineteenth-century assumptions about the
sexes' "separate spheres":
In the name of liberation from male domination, women must not
appropriate to themselves male characteristics contrary to their feminine
"originality." There is a well founded fear that if they take this path,
women will not reach fulfillment but instead will deform.., their es-
sential richness .... Parenthood, although it belongs to both-is realized
more fully in the woman. Motherhood involves a special communion
with the mystery of life... which profoundly marks the woman's per-
sonality.6
7
Other conservatives arrive at similar conclusions through more secular
routes. Some draw on sociobiological accounts of gender hierarchy. According
to these theorists, "Mother Nature is sexist."68 Males' and females' different
reproductive physiologies are reportedly responsible for sex-based distinctions
in aggression and parental responsibilities. From these basic distinctions others
emerge.69 As E.O. Wilson explains, "t]he physical and temperamental dif-
ferences between men and women have been amplified by culture into male
dominance. History records not a single society in which women have con-
trolled the political and economic lives of men."70 Although some
sociobiologists, including Wilson, acknowledge that societies could "probably
cancel" the consequences of sex-based difference, they warn that such a project
would require "a conscious decision based on fuller and more exact knowledge
than is now available. '71
Despite extensive evidence undermining sociobiological premises, their
proponents have retained influence in conservative circles.72 Females' absence
67. Excerpts from Pope John Paul 11's Apostolic Letter, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1988, § 1, at 6, col. 2.
For discussion of how the Mormon Church's similar support for traditional gender roles affects women's
legal and social status, see UTAH TASK FORCE ON GENDER & JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE UTAH JUDICIAL
COUNCIL 14-15, 34, 98 (1990) [hereinafter UTAH TASK FORCE].
68. D. BARASH, THE WHISPERINGS WITHIN (1979), quoted in Hubbard, Social Effects of Some Contem-
porary Myths About Women, in WOMAN'S NATURE: RATIONALIZATIONS OF INEQUALITY 1, 6 (M. Lowe &
R. Hubbard eds. 1988).
69. See, e.g., R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 152-55 (1976). Dawkins, like Edward Wilson, views
the relative size of sex cells, or gametes, as central to sex-based subordination. The egg is relatively large,
and contains the yolk that nourishes the embryo during early development, while the sperm is relatively
small, mobile, and easily replicated. Since "each sperm is so tiny, a male can afford to make millions of
them every day" and "beget a large number of children in a very short period of time." Id. at 152. By
contrast, the female has greater responsibilities to each embryo; "[flemale exploitation begins here." Id.;
see also E.O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY 156 (abr. ed. 1980).
70. E.O. WILSON, ON HUMAN NATURE 128 (1978); see also sources cited supra note 69; infra notes
71 &73.
71. E.O. WILSON, supra note 70, at 133-34. Other commentators deny that any cultural interventions
could be successful; in their view, "it is impossible to overcome the biological inevitability of sex roles,
but it is possible to try-and to violate fundamental liberal values [of liberty and autonomy] in the process."
M. LEVIN, FEMINISM AND FREEDOM 3 (1987); see also sources cited supra note 69.
72. For critical reviews, see generally L. BrKE, WOMEN, FEMINISM AND BIOLOGY: THE FEMINIST
CHALLENGE (1986); R. BLEIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER: A CRITIQUE OF BIOLOGY AND ITS THEORIES ON
WOMEN (1984); A. FAUSTO-STERLiNG, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES ABOUT MEN AND
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from the ranks of chess grand masters, computer experts, and national political
leaders have all been attributed to "natural" causes: raging hormones, spatial
incapacities, and inadequate testosterone.73 To many observers, it is hardly
coincidental that the Japanese firms dominating technological markets are
almost exclusively male.74 Scholars applying sociobiological frameworks to
legal doctrine have counseled against "attempting to achieve an androgynous
society through antidiscrimination laws."' In their view, sex-based distinctions
are appropriate on issues ranging from the exclusion of women in aggressive
roles such as military combat to the exclusion of men from caretaking roles
such as flight attendants or custodians of small children. 76 With similar reason-
ing, New Right theorists assert the "inevitability of patriarchy" and warn that
policies challenging traditional gender norms can only result in "sexual suicide"
and cultural chaos.77
Although explicit assertions of female inferiority appear with declining
frequency, their influence cannot be entirely discounted. According to recent
public opinion polls, a majority of Americans believe that most men think they
are "better" than women. 78 About a third of surveyed adults view masculine
and feminine characteristics as biologically based, and an equal percentage of
women express support for traditional male breadwinner/female homemaker
roles. 79 Substantially larger percentages of both women and men believe that
husbands' careers should take priority over wives' and that husbands need not
WOMEN (1984); E. LEACOCK, MYTHS OF MALE DOMINANCE (1981); Hubbard, The Political Nature of
"Human Nature," in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 38, at 63; Kay, Perspectives on Sociobiology,
Feminism, and the Law, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 38, at 74.
73. See, e.g., Gilder, The Myth of the Role Revolution, in GENDER SANITY 230 (N. Davidson ed. 1989)
[collection as whole hereinafter GENDER SANITY]; Hare-Mustin & Marecek, On Making a Difference, in
MAKING A DIFFERENCE: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER 1, 10 (1990) [collection as
whole hereinafter MAKING A DIFFERENCE]; see also Christen, Sex Differences in the Human Brain, in
GENDER SANITY, supra, at 150 (arguing that men are more gifted in perceiving physical world and women
more gifted in social relations, and that such differences explain vocational differences, such as women's
ability to assemble watches but not to design or repair them).
74. Gilder, supra note 73, at 234; see also other sources cited supra note 73 and sources cited infra
note 77.
75. Browne, Biology, Equality, and the Law: The Legal Significance of Biological Sex Differences,
38 SW. L.L 617, 619 (1984).
76. See . BECKSTROM, SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THE LAW: THE BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM IN THE COURTROOM
OF THE FUTURE 75-92 (1985); Beckstrom, The Potential Dangers and Benefits of Introducing Sociobiology
to Lawyers, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1279, 1288-92 (1984). See generally Kay, supra note 72, at 78-80 (providing
critique of such theories).
77. See generally N. DAVIDSON, THE FAILURE OF FEMINISM (1988); G. GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE
(1986); G. GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE (1973); S. GOLDBERG, THE INEVITABILITY OF PATRIARCHY (1973).
For critical reviews, see Z. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY (1984).
78. Belkin, Bars to Equality of Sexes Seen as Eroding, Slowly, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1989, § 1, at 1,
col. 1 (53% of women and 48% of men believe men consider themselves superior).
79. ROPER ORG., THE VIRGINIA SLimS AMERICAN WOMEN'S POLL 27-28 (1985) [hereinafter VIRGINIA
SLIMS POLL] (23% of respondents believed that basic physical differences caused masculine and feminine
behavior and another 16% felt that both physical differences and childrearing patterns were responsible);
Destefano & Colasanto, Most Believe U.S. Men Have a Better Life, San Francisco Chron., Feb. 5, 1990,
at B5, col. 5.
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share evenly in family responsibilities."0 About half of surveyed women also
consider women inferior for certain occupations ranging from airline pilot to
combat soldier.8"
Debates over female participation in the armed forces offer a representative
array of gender stereotypes. According to legislators such as Webber Borchers
of Illinois, the nation can ill afford women soldiers whose "inadequate hip
structure," "tender [feet]," and hesitance to "press the attack" would "hamstring
the infantry." During the Persian Gulf conflict, some military officers com-
plained that female involvement was a "pain in the butt." There was no point
having a lot of women around "doing nothing" except "distracting men" since
"it is pretty clear that they can't accomplish as much as a man and can't
compete in strength." 2 The assignment of women even to button-pushing
positions has appeared an unnecessary "gamble" given sex differences in
aggression and interpersonal concerns, namely females' greater likelihood of
"see[ing] their target[s] as people," and males' demonstrably greater willingness
to "kill impersonally."8 3
The stereotypes underlying these assumptions appear largely unaffected by
evidence. Despite the declining importance of physical strength in modern
warfare, and the increasing data on female effectiveness in combat, simulated
combat, and related police and prison contexts, legal decisionmakers have
80. For example, when asked about a hypothetical situation in which a husband and wife with no
children both have good jobs and the husband receives a "very good" job offer in another city, over 71%
of the women felt that the wife should relocate. Where the situation was reversed and the wife received
the offer, only 21% felt that the husband should relocate. See 1985 VIRGINIA SLIMS POLL, supra note 79,
at 28; see also A. HoCHsHILD & A. MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME 266 (1989) (half of surveyed women plan to put their husband's job first; two thirds
of men plan to put their own job first).
For attitudes concerning husband's family obligations, see J. PLECK, WORKING WIVES/WORKING
HUSBANDS 33, 44-45, 90-92 (1985) (finding that wives do substantially more domestic work than husbands
but only about a third express desire for husbands to do more); Cowan, Women's Gains on the Job: Not
Without a Heavy Toll, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1989, at A1, col 1, A14, col. 4 (only 27% of wives felt that
husbands did less than "fair share" in the house but studies find that women do twice as much housework
as men); infra Part IV.A.I.
81. See sources cited supra note 73 and infra notes 82-83; 1985 VIRGINIA SLIMS POLL, supra note
79, at 35. For example, 50% of a male sample in a Virginia Slims Poll had more confidence in a male
policeman and 49% in a male pilot. Id. Within the engineering profession, there appears wide acceptance
of the claim that "male dominance is almost certainly due to the males' cognitive advantage rather than
to a culturally induced female disadvantage." M. LEVIN, supra note 71, at 99; see also C. COCKBURN,
MACHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN AND TECHNICAL KNow-HOW 165-72 (1985).
82. Bishop, The Gulf War: Women Marines Philosophical Before the Fray, Daily Telegraph, Jan. 26,
1991, at 3; Royco, Borchers Hip to Girl Power, Chi. Daily News, Mar. 26, 1973, at 12, col. 1; see also
Crisis in the Gulf: Women's Place at the Front Provokes Fears at Home, The Independent, Feb. 4, 1991,
at 3 (quoting claim of Brian Mitchell, author of WEAK LINK: THE FEMINIZATION OF THE AMERICAN
MILITARY (1988), that "[h]alf the women in the Marine Corps cannot throw a grenade far enough to avoid
injuring themselves"). For other concerns, see sources cited in D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 67, 100; infra
text accompanying note 83.
83. M. LEVIN, supra note 71, at 239; see also Webb, Women Can't Fight, in GENDER SANITY, supra
note 73, at 208.
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largely refused to apply antidiscrimination principles to military service." That
refusal both affirms and extends the continued legacy of traditional stereotypes.
3. Gender Bias: Academic and Employment Settings
In other contexts, assumptions about female inferiority draw less directly
on religious or sociobiological premises and operate at less conscious levels.
Gender restrictions in educational institutions are a case in point. Although most
public justifications of single-sex schools have presented them as "separate but
equal,"85 some defenders of all-male institutions have appeared less certain
about the "equal." During the early 1970's, Harvard's Director of Admissions
explained that sex-blind policies were undesirable because they would require
reductions in the number of male students to accommodate women, and that
would mean "less diversity in the class and, as a result, fewer interesting
people." 6 Opponents of coeducation at Yale expressed related concerns. As
one professor put it, "I feel a greater sense of accomplishment when I direct
my efforts toward those who will one day have a greater role than women in
society."87 Alumni were similarly worried about male undergraduates "who
would want to concentrate on the basic principles of thermodynamics," but
would instead be distracted by steady dates "trying to gossip about all the
idiotic trivia all women try to impose on men. '88
Yet despite such attitudes, legal decisionmakers have generally declined to
interfere with admission policies at all-male institutions.8 9 Federal civil rights
law expressly permits sex-based admissions by traditionally single-sex private
schools, and federal courts have consistently sustained such practices at all-male
public institutions." Thus, recent trends toward coeducation have occurred
84. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding male-only registration system for military
service). For analysis of women's effectiveness in military and related contexts, see M. BINKIN & S. BACH,
WOMEN AND THE MILrrARY 81-91 (1977); L. LAFLN, WOMEN IN BATTLES 10, 22,62-79 (1968); H. ROGAN,
MIXED COMPANY: WOMEN IN THE MODERN ARMY 258 (1981); J. STIEHM, BRING ME MEN AND WOMEN:
MANDATED CHANGE AT THE U.S. AIR FORCE ACADEMY 129-30, 167, 199, 250 (1981); Kornblum, Women
Warriors in a Men's World: The Combat Exclusion, 2 LL. & INEQUALITY 351, 395-428 (1984); Sayers,
Science, Sexual Difference, and Feminism, in ANALYZING GENDER: A HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH 68, 85 (B. Hess & M. Ferree eds. 1987) [collection as whole hereinafter ANALYZING GENDER].
85. D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 274, 288-98; 2 T. WOODY, supra note 16, at 151-53, 210, 271-79.
86. As quoted in Zinberg, College: When the Future Becomes the Present, in WOMEN AND SUCCESS
129, 131 (R. Kundsin ed. 1974).
87. J. LEVER & P. SCHWARTZ, WOMEN AT YALE: LIBERATING A COLLEGE CAMPUS 35 (1971).
88. As quoted in id.
89. For three centuries the exclusion of women from public and private institutions passed without
judicial objection. See, e.g., Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977); Kirstein v. Rector, 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970); Heaton v. Bristol,
317 S.W.2d 86, 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959); Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d
251, 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960).
90. Title IX, barring sex discrimination by federally funded programs, included an exception for public
undergraduate institutions that had traditionally and continuously maintained single-sex admission policies.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1982). Certain sections of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act that apply to
elementary and secondary education omit sex from the list of prohibited discriminations; other sections
include sex. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d at 880. Ironically, the only case in which the
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largely without legal impetus. Nor has the promotion of gender equality been
a primary motivating factor. Rather, administrators at all-male institutions
worried that they could not retain educational prominence or financial stability
if they continued to exclude not only all qualified female candidates but also
the rising number of male applicants who preferred a gender-integrated environ-
ment.91 At graduate and professional schools, female representation increased
when the Vietnam War reduced the number of male applicants. Only at that
point did many educators find it necessary to admit those whom Harvard
President Nathan Pusey characterized as "the blind, the lame, and the wom-
en."
92
If gender equality has not been a principal impetus for coeducation, neither
has it been a necessary result. Again, much of the current problem reflects
denials that a problem persists. Women's increasing presence has often been
taken as testament that equal treatment has been achieved. Yet recent surveys
reveal continued biases in classroom interaction, instructional materials, voca-
tional preparation, and personnel practices.93
Legal education is no exception. Sex bias in standard texts and curricular
offerings remains common. Teaching materials frequently retain demeaning
stereotypes of women as credulous consumers, irrational jurors, and passive
victims.' Rarely are the sentiments quite as explicit as in one prominent
casebook's assertion that "land, like woman, was meant to be possessed."'95
More often the problem is inattention. Women's voices are often silenced in
the classroom just as "women's issues" are often omitted from the curricu-
lum. 96 Comments by female students and faculty are more likely to be dis-
Supreme Court has struck down gender-exclusive policies involved bans against male, not female, applicants.
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 745 (1982).
91. J. LEVER & P. SCHWARTZ, supra note 87, at 58.
92. As quoted in Harris, The Second Sex in Academe, 56 A.A.U.P. BULL. 283, 283 (1970).
93. See B. SANDLER & R. HALL, THE CAMPUS CLIMATE REVISITED: CHILLY FOR WOMEN FACULTY,
ADMINISTRATORS AND GRADUATE STUDENTS 13 n.5, 67-69 (1986); D. TYACK & E. HANSOT, LEARNING
TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF COEDUCATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 250-77 (1990); Karp & Yoels, The
College Classroom: Some Observations on the Meanings of Student Participation, 60 Soc. & SOC. RES.
421 (1976); Fiske, Lessons, N.Y. Tunes, Apr. 11, 1990, at B8, col. 1.
94. See Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 137, 138-43 (1988); Coombs, Crime
in the Stacks, or a Tale of a Text: A Feminist Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 3. LEGAL EDUC.
117 (1988); Elkins, On the Significance of Women in Legal Education, 7 A.L.S.A.F. 290 (1984); Erickson,
Final Report, Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law Casebooks, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (1990);
Erickson, Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 101, 105 (1988)
[hereinafter Sex Bias in Law School Courses]; Frug, Re-Reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a
Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 1065 (1985).
95. C. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE: CASES, STATUTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 139 (1968),
quoted in Ginsburg & Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 9. The genre is not entirely extinct, see, e.g., E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL
PROPERTY LAW, at xx (2d ed. 1982) ("Property law, like pornography, has something for everyone.").
96. Homer & Schwartz, Admitted but Not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School,
5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990); Weiss & Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN.
L. REV. 1299 (1988); Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209(1988).
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counted, dismissed, interrupted, or misattributed than those of male col-
leagues. 97 Empirical surveys at Yale and other law schools have quantified
female students' discontent and disengagement under adversarial styles of legal
education.9
While contemporary feminism has succeeded in putting these issues on the
agenda, its project is by no means complete. Women hold fewer than 15% of
tenured academic posts, women of color have barely reached even token levels,
and most law schools still offer no course on sex-based discrimination. Fewer
still give any attention to issues of sexual orientation.99 Too many reforms
have rested with an "add woman and stir" approach-a single elective course
offering, or an occasional obligatory reference to "women's issues." Too few
initiatives have undertaken what is truly required, a fundamental reassessment
of academic premises and priorities.
Any adequate response to gender bias will require a more central role for
values traditionally associated with women. That, in turn, implies less competi-
tive and combative forms of legal education and more attention to concerns of
subordinate groups. Development of empathetic skills, cooperative opportunities,
and participatory styles of interaction must become higher priorities. to Writ-
ing about women's issues, counseling women students, and reserving time for
"women's work" in family settings must become more compatible with career
advancement. Analogous changes have to extend beyond faculty and students
to employees who are less privileged members of the law school community.
Educational institutions, like other employment settings, need restructuring to
promote a more caring work environment, to accommodate greater family
commitments, and to ensure greater inclusion of minority groups. The objective,
as Virginia Woolf once emphasized, is not for women simply to "join the
academic procession," but also to rethink its direction.101
97. See sources cited supra note 96. For similar patterns in other academic contexts, see LANGUAGE,
GENDER, AND SOCIErY (B. Thorne, C. Kramarae & N. Henley eds. 1983); sources cited supra note 93.
98. See Banks, supra note 94; Homer & Schwartz, supra note 96; Weiss & Melling, supra note 96.
99. For women's underrepresentation in higher status and higher paying positions, see Chused, The
Hiring and Retention of Minorities and Women on American Law School Faculties, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
537, 548-55, 557 table HI (1988); Thorner, Gender and the Professions: The Search for Equal Access, 4
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 81, 90-92 (1990). For the absence of sex discrimination courses, see Sex Bias in
Law School Courses, supra note 94, at 103. For the absence of sexual orientation courses, see Miller, The
Legal Closet, 16 STUDENT LAW. 12, 14 (1988).
Women of color confront devaluation on two fronts and their small numbers in most academic settings
makes such preconceptions especially difficult to challenge. See sources cited in J. FERNANDEZ, RACISM
AND SEXISM IN CORPORATE LIFE: CHANGING VALUES IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 107 (1981); Y. MOSES,
BLACK WOMEN IN ACADEME: ISSUES AND STRATEGIES 3-6 (1989); Homer & Schwartz, supra note 96, at
21-22, 33-46.
100. For discussion of the value of empathy as epistemological technique, see M. BELENKY, B.
CLINCHY, N. GOLDBERGER & J. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING (1986); Held, Feminism and
Epistemology: Recent Work on the Connection Between Gender and Knowledge, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 296,
306-07 (1985). For discussion of alternative classroom styles, see Crenshaw, Foreword: Toward a Race-
Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. I (1989); Wildman, The Question of Silence:
Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147 (1988).
101. V. WOOLF, THREE GUINEAS 62-63 (1938).
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Related sex-based biases arise in a wide variety of other contexts, and
present related challenges. Despite substantial recent changes in gender roles,
gender stereotypes have remained remarkably resilient.102 For example, the
same resumes, scholarly articles, or artistic works are rated lower when they
are attributed to a woman rather than a man."° Females' performance in
negotiation and experimental tasks is evaluated less favorably than males' even
when objective outcomes are the same."° Compared with men, women tend
to rate their own work more harshly, and are less likely to take credit for
favorable results. 5 Since studies involving racial bias reveal similar patterns,
women of color face special obstacles. For them, the paradox of too little and
too much attention is especially pronounced; their positive contributions are
most often overlooked and their mistakes most often noticed.106
Gender socialization patterns also leave many women workers in a familiar
double bind; they are criticized for being "too feminine" or not "feminine
enough."0 7 What is viewed as assertive in a man is abrasive in a woman.
Given the inconsistency between traits associated with femininity and those
associated with vocational achievement, female performance is frequently
undervalued. Unconscious bias affects evaluations not only of women's abilities
102. A. EAGLY, SEX DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-ROLE INTERPRETATION 31 (1987);
Ruble & Ruble, Sex Stereotypes, in IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN STEREOTYP-
ING 188, 228 (A. Miller ed. 1982). See generally G. POWELL, WOMEN AND MEN IN MANAGEMENT (1985).
103. Lott, The Devaluation of Women's Competence, 41 1. SOC. ISSUES, No. 4, 1985, at 43, 50; Nieva
& Gutek, Sex Effects on Evaluation, 5 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 267,273 (1980) (pro-male bias most likely where
inferences are required, where sex-role incongruity appears, and high level of performance or qualification
is required); Paludi & Bauer, Goldberg Revisited: What's in an Author's Name, 9 SEX ROLES 387 (1983);
Paludi & Strayer, What's in an Author's Name? Differential Evaluations of Perfonnance as a Function of
Author's Name, 12 SEX ROLES 353 (1985); Ruble & Ruble, supra note 102, at 205-07.
104. See D. KOLB & G. COOLIDGE, HER PLACE AT THE TABLE: A CONSIDERATION OF GENDER ISSUES
IN NEGOTIATION 23 (Harvard Program on Negotiation Working Paper Series No. 88-5, 1988); Deaux, From
Individual Differences to Social Categories: Analysis of a Decade's Research on Gender, 39 AM. PSYCHOL-
OGIST 105, 110-11 (1984). For similar patterns in other contexts, see generally V. NIEVA & B. GUTEK,
VOMEN AND WORK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1981).
105. Lott, supra note 103, at 51; Major, Gender Differences in Comparisons and Entitlement: Implica-
tions for Comparable Worth, 45 J. SOC. ISSUES, No. 4, 1989, at 99,106; Shepela & Viviano, Some Psychologi-
cal Factors Affecting Job Segregation and Wages, in COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION:
TECHNICAL POSSIBILITIES AND POLITICAL REALITIES 47, 51-52 (H. Remick ed. 1984) [collection as whole
hereinafter COMPARABLE WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION]; see also Smithson, Introduction: Investigat-
ing Gender, Power and Pedagogy, in GENDER IN THE CLASSROOM: POWER AND PEDAGOGY 5 (S. Gabriel
& L Smithson eds. 1990) (female engineering students rate themselves lower than male colleagues in math,
science, and problem-solving despite having higher GPA and SAT scores); Rhode, supra note 53, at 1189
n.139 (1988) (summarizing studies).
106. See J. FERNANDEZ, supra note 99, at 107 (statistics); sources cited in Y. MOSES, supra note 99,
at 3-6; Bielby, Modern Prejudice and Institutional Barriers to Equal Employmentfor Minorities, 43 J. SOC.
ISSUES, No. 1, 1987, at 79; Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Alexander, Minority Women Feel Racism, Sexism are Blocking the
Path to Management, Wall St. J., July 25, 1990, at B1, col. 3.
107. When asked what constituted "too feminine," a typical male manager's response was: "[I]t's hard
to explain." A. MORRISON, R. WHITE & E. VAN VELSOR, supra note 9, at54, 61-62,79. For other examples,
see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); A. ASTRACHAN, HOW MEN FEEL: THEIR RESPONSE
TO WOMEN'S DEMANDS FOR EQUALITY AND POWER 151-52 (1986); C. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 279-82;
B. MILWOOD, WHAT YOU GET WHEN You Go FOR IT 140 (1987); UTAH TASK FORCE, supra note 67, at
20.
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but also of "women's work." A growing body of cross-cultural, clinical, and
historical evidence indicates that tasks performed by women are undervalued
because they are performed by women. 08 Jobs classified as "female" are
thought to require less effort and ability and to deserve less compensation than
identical work that is classified as male. 9 When asked how much pay they
deserve for a particular task, women select lower amounts than men. °10 Such
evaluative patterns are apparent across a wide range of cultures. As Margaret
Mead once noted, in some villages men fish and women weave, and in other
villages women fish and men weave, but in either case the work performed by
women is valued less."' Similar biases help account for certain occupational
reward structures in this country: school teachers who earn no more than state
liquor store clerks and librarians who earn less than crossing guards or water-
meter readers.112
Such gender biases affect not only the assessment of females' performance,
they also affect the performance itself. Negative feedback or special scrutiny
leads to increased anxiety, diminished aspirations, and employment difficulties.
Initial adverse expectations are reinforced and a self-perpetuating cycle contin-
ues. 1 Women who depart from traditional roles have special visibility, and
their performance is often recalled in ways that foster ideologies of denial.
Female employees who "don't work out" confirm traditional assumptions about
gender-linked capacities and choices, while those who succeed encourage
perceptions that gender bias has been eliminated. Since individuals tend to
recall patterns that are consistent with prior assumptions and to forget those that
are not, these sex-based stereotypes are difficult to dislodge.1 The desire to
108. See. e.g., Steinberg& Haignere, Equitable Compensation: Methodological Criteriafor Comparable
Worth, in INGREDIENTS, supra note 4, at 157, 165; Reskin, Bringing the Men Back in: Sex Differentiation
and the Devaluation of Women's Work, 2 GENDER & SOc'Y 58, 74-75 (1988), reprinted in THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF GENDER 145-46 (J. Lorber & S. Farrell eds. 1991).
109. Wittig & Lowe, Comparable Worth Theory and Practice, 45 J. Soc. ISSUES, No. 4, 1989, at 1,
7; see also Major, supra note 105; Major & Forcey, Social Comparisons and Pay Evaluations: Preferences
for Same-Sex and Same-Job Wage Comparisons, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 393 (1985);
McArthur & Obrant, Sex Biases in Comparable Worth Analysis, 16 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 757, 766-69
(1986). But see Mount & Ellis, Sources of Bias in Job Evaluation, 45 J. SOC. ISSUEs, No. 4, 1989, at 153,
155-58 (reviewing studies finding no consistent bias in lab settings).
110. A. EAGLY, supra note 102, at 111; Major, supra note 105, at 105; Major & Forcey, supra note
109, at 393; Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, Overworked and Underpaid: On the Nature of Gender Differences
in Personal Entitlement, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 1399, 1399-1412 (1984).
111. M. MEAD, MALE & FEMALE: A STUDY OF THE SEXES IN A CHANGING WORLD 159-60 (1949).
112. See D. KIRP, M. YuDOF & M. FRANKS, GENDER JUSTICE 168 (1986); Savage, San Jose's Equal
Pay Plan Survives, L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
113. K. DEAUX, THE BEHAVIOR OF WOMEN AND MEN 24-34 (1976).
114. See Aronson, The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Current Perspective, in COGNITIvE THEORIES
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 181, 192-96 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1978); Hamilton, Stereotyping and Intergroup
Behavior: Some Thoughts on the Cognitive Approach, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND
INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 333, 340 (D. Hamilton ed. 1981). See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
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believe in a "just world" further reinforces unconscious biases; assumptions
about women's incapacity make women's inequality less unfair."15
Taken together, these lingering stereotypes reinforce gender hierarchy by
obscuring its dynamics. The result is that sex-based subordination appears
natural and necessary, rather than a consequence of societal construction and
a subject for societal challenge. Dislodging such patterns will require more than
the formal equal treatment guarantees that legal doctrine has prescribed. Rather,
as subsequent discussion reflects, we need a fundamental reassessment of
gender difference and the social disadvantages it has entailed.
III. THE DENIAL OF INEQUALITY
A second way to dismiss gender inequality as a social problem is to deny
that such inequality exists. This strategy takes two forms. Under the first
approach, each sex has distinctive attributes, roles, and rewards that are "sepa-
rate but equal," and definitions of equality are adjusted accordingly. This
ideological framework builds on common cognitive processes. As both histori-
cal and psychological research make evident, individuals tend to adopt concep-
tions of fairness that maximize their own entitlement.116 Similarly, those in
subordinate positions who feel powerless to affect their status often internalize
frameworks that deny its injustice."7 Thus, for many men, separate-but-equal
frameworks can perpetuate advantage by masking its existence. For many
women, the illusion of equality has been a comforting substitute for its realiza-
tion.
The flip side of this strategy has been to devalue rather than celebrate
difference. In effect, this approach has confused formal with substantive
equality and has ignored the social consequences of sex-linked attributes and
experiences. Under this framework, women have been expected to accommo-
date the demands of formerly male-dominated institutions rather than the
converse.
For feminists, these dual strategies have posed longstanding dilemmas. How
to acknowledge difference without perpetuating the legal and social disadvan-
tages that have followed from it remains a central challenge.
115. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
116. Fairness, Preference and Fairness Biases, in EQUITY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 82-90 (D. Messick & K. Cook eds. 1983) [collection as whole hereinafter EQUIrY
THEORY]. For examples of in-group bias, see Atkinson, The Perception of Social Categories: Implications
for the Social Comparison Process, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON: THE ONTARIO
SYMPOSIUM 117, 119-22 (1986) [collection as whole hereinafter RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL
COMPARISON] (individuals randomly assigned to groups but who believe assignment is based on some shared
characteristic will favor own group in distributing resources).
117. Major, supra note 105, at 106; Wills, Downward Comparison Principles in Social Psychology,
90 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL 245, 264-68 (1981) (individuals tend to compare themselves with others who
are equally or more unfortunate); see also infra text accompanying note 218.
17551991]
The Yale Law Journal
A. The Embrace of Difference
In America, separate-but-equal ideologies gained prominence during the
early nineteenth century. At a time when industrialization and urbanization in
the North were forcing more productive and social activities outside the home,
a cult of domesticity emerged to reaffirm the centrality of family life.118 Simi-
lar patterns occurred in the southern plantation culture, where white femininity
embodied pristine virtue and Black femininity was associated with sensuality
and base desire." 9 In both settings, white women acquired an exalted though
circumscribed status. Within their separate empire, wives reportedly reigned
supreme; from the "throne of the heart," they shaped the character of their
children and the destiny of the nation.2 To preserve their moral influence,
women were to remain free of the "muck and mire" of political and commercial
life. '2 Observers like Alexis de Tocqueville asserted that although women
were "confined within the narrow circle of domestic life and their situation
[was] one of extreme dependence," nowhere did they occupy a "loftier posi-
tion.""
Similar themes emerged throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Antisuffragists often insisted that unequal rights were not a mark of unequal
status, but simply a recognition of sexual difference and complementary roles.
Contemporary conservatives have ascribed similar importance to the maternal
mission. As Pat Robertson put it: "Who rules our nation? Who is going to
determine the next generation? It's not going to be the politicians and the
presidents and the senators and the judges-it's going to be the mothers." 1 3
Such views have had significant influence on public policy and private
decisionmaking. Issues such as abortion, childcare, welfare, and the Equal
Rights Amendment have provided ample legislative opportunity to celebrate
difference. They have also mobilized traditional homemakers in defense of their
status, dignity, and way of life. In debates over the ERA, many opposition
groups chose names that clearly reflected their members' views: "Feminine
118. Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood, 1820-1860, Am. Q., Summer 1966, at 151, 174.
119. See P. GIDDINGS, supra note 26, at 47-52, 53; B. HOOKS, supra note 41, at 31-39.
120. A. GRAVES, WOMEN IN AMERICA: BEING AN EXAMINATION INTO THE MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL
CONDITIONS OF AMERICAN FEMALE SOCIETY 151 (1847).
121. A. KRADITOR, supra note 20, at 18-20 (quoting Florida legislator among others); see also C.
DEGLER, supra note 35.
122. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 227 (H. Reeve trans. 4th ed. 1841).
123. The Family and the Law, Address by Pat Robertson, Family Forum II Conference in Washington,
D.C. (July 27, 1982), quoted in R. KLATCH, supra note 65, at 136; see also Building a Morally Strong
America, Address by J. Denton, Over the Rainbow Celebration in Washington, D.C. (July 1, 1989), quoted
in R. KLATCH, supra note 65, at 141 ("Why do women want equality when for four or five thousand years
they enjoyed the superiority which we accord them ... ?").
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AntiFeminists," "Winsome Wives and Homemakers," and "Women Who Want
to be Women."'' 1
1. Employment
One of my earliest personal encounters with such separate-but-equal
worldviews occurred while I was a Yale law student interviewing for summer
jobs. At a leading Wall Street firm, a senior litigator invited me to survey his
office crammed with files, folders, and document carriers. He then pointed to
a photograph of his wife, four lovely children, and two golden retrievers at
leisure on the family's summer estate. Gesturing first toward the picture and
then toward the files, he asked with genuine curiosity: "Why would a young
lady like you want to trade all this for that?" Why, I wondered, do only ladies
have to choose? What I said was rather less memorable.
That same issue reechoes with tedious consistency. Popular press accounts
offer endless reruns of the same scripts. In one variation, the unhappy heroine
comes fully endowed with meaningful career and miserable life-single and
barren, or fertile and frantic."z In an alternative variation, she abandons ca-
reer for hearth and home, and everyone lives happily ever after." Such popu-
lar morality plays help legitimate gender hierarchy. Their underlying message
is that for women, unlike men, family roles require career sacrifice, and anyone
who assumes otherwise will pay a substantial price.
A more sophisticated version of this view builds on human capital theories
of occupational inequality. According to these theories, women seek to recon-
cile competing job and family demands by making a lower career investment;
they choose occupations that tend not to require extended training, long hours,
inflexible schedules, or skills that deteriorate with absence from the
124. For a full catalog of anti-ERA groups, see J. BOLES, supra note 62, at 200-02. Other organizations
included: American Women Already Richly Endowed; Happiness of Motherhood Eternal (HOME);
Humanitarians Opposed to Degrading Our Girls; Housewives and Motherhood Anti-Lib Movement; Right
To Be a Woman; and Women for Maintaining the Differences Between the Sexes and Against the ERA.
125. See, e.g., Amiel, Feminism Hits Middle Age, NAT'L REV., Nov. 27, 1989, at 24 (noting that many
women in suits bought with their own credit cards find "no one to come home to"); Salholz, Michael, Staff,
Doherty, Abramson & Winger, Too Late for Prince Charming?, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1986, at 54-55.
126. See, e.g., Finkel, The Last Housewife in America, ESQUIRE, July 1990, at 102; Fisher, I Want to
Stay Home-Where I Belong, REDBOOK, Apr. 1986, at 96; Larson, I Was a Career Junkie, WORKING
WOMAN, June 1986, at 48; Mansfield, Hittin' It Big & Kissin' It Goodbye, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1985, at
C1, col. 3. See generally Evans, Mothers Making Themselves More at Home, Wash. Post, Oct. 2, 1989, at
AI, col. 1.
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workforce. 27 From this vantage, sex-based disparities in employment status
are a justifiable reflection of sex-based choices regarding family roles.
Although such accounts have some factual basis, they exaggerate the gender
difference on which their conclusion depends. It is true that women are more
likely to take extended leaves, work part-time, and place somewhat lower
priority on occupational advancement than their male counterparts. 12 But a
growing body of research suggests that these characteristics may be more a
response to, than a cause of, employment segregation and stratification. 12 9 So
too, most studies find that human capital factors such as experience, education,
hours worked and so forth cannot account for more than half of all gender
disparities.130 On the whole, women who make comparable investments in
time, training, and experience do not advance as far or as fast as their male
counterparts. 31 Nor does their work command comparable rewards. Human
capital theories cannot explain the patterns of undervaluation noted earlier, in
which tasks performed by women are rated lower than identical work performed
by men. 32 To account for these dynamics requires acknowledgement of gen-
der biases that separate-but-equal frameworks deny.
So too, the gender roles that these frameworks prescribe are increasingly
out of step with the needs and aspirations of most women. By choice or
127. G. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 178-80 (2d ed. 1975); M. LEVIN, supra note 71, at 145-51; J.
ROBACH, A MATTER OF CHOICE 30-32 (1986); Blau & Jusenius, Economists' Approaches to Sex Segregation
in the Labor Market: An Appraisal, in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF OCCUPA-
TIONAL SEGREGATION 181, 185-88 (M. Blaxall & B. Reagan eds. 1976) [collection as whole hereinafter
WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE]; Finn, The Earnings Gap and Economic Choices, in EQUAL PAY FOR
UNEQUAL WORK 100, 105-14 (P. Schlafly ed. 1984); Levin, The Earnings Gap and Family Choices, in
EQUAL PAY FOR UNEQUAL WORK, supra at 125, 130-35. See generally Becker, Human Capital: Effort and
the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 533 (1985).
128. Research on women's differential expectations of success is summarized in D. KAUFMAN & B.
RICHARDSON, ACHIEVEMENT AND WOMEN: CHALLENGING THE ASSUMPTIONS 49-50,96 (1982); Lacey, Job
Attribute Preference and Work Commitment of Men and Women in the US., 36 PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY
324 (Summer 1983).
129. R. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 149-59 (1977); Schultz, Telling Stories
About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1819, 1828-29 (1990).
130. See H. AARON & C. LOUGY, THE COMPARABLE WORTH CONTROVERSY 12-13 (1986); Hartmann,
Roos & Trieman, An Agenda for Basic Research on Comparable Worth, in COMPARABLE WORTH: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 13-33 (H. Hartmann ed. 1985).
131. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSIONS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
2-6 (1988) [hereinafter ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN]; Spur, Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession: A
Study of Promotion, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 406 (1990) (women about half as likely as men to achieve
partnership during surveyed years even though they did not differ significantly from men in academic
distinction or productivity); Strober, The MBA Degree: Same Passport to Success for Women and Men?,
in WOMEN IN THE WORKPLACE 24, 39-42 (P. Wallace ed. 1982) (finding that female MBA's advance less
far than similarly qualified males).
For a critical review of human capital theories and their inability to account for various wage and
occupational patterns, see Blau, Occupational Segregation and Labor Market Discrimination, in SEX
SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE 118-26 (B. Reskin ed. 1984); Corcoran & Duncan, Work History, Labor
Force Attachment, and Earnings Differences Between the Races and Sexes, 14 . HUM. RESOURCES 3 (1979);
England, The Failure of Human Capital Theory to Explain Occupational Sex Segregation, 17 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 358 (1982).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05, 108-12.
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necessity, a growing percentage of women have become single heads of
households, a trend especially pronounced among women of color.13 Recent
research generally indicates that women who combine work and family roles
have the highest rates of satisfaction and that increasing percentages of wives
prefer their husbands assume equal domestic responsibilities." Of course,
as subsequent discussion suggests, these preferences remain a substantial
distance from realization.1 35 But it is nonetheless significant that a growing
majority of women aspire to equality on different terms than those separate-but-
equal frameworks envision.
2. Associations
Such frameworks present comparable problems in other contexts, partic-
ularly those where celebration of women's difference occurs in their absence.
Single-sex associations are an obvious illustration. To many observers, such
gender segregation is not a form of gender discrimination but an affirmation
of gender differences. 136 From this vantage, it is sufficient that women have
their own organizations; if members of elite male clubs want a private space
protected from female intrusion, feminists should not make a federal case out
of it.'37
On that point, the judiciary has agreed. It has distinguished public and
private institutions and exempted the latter from federal equal protection
doctrine. 13 Such distinctions ignore the extent to which private associations
receive public support and serve public functions. All-male clubs typically
depend on tax subsidies and liquor licenses, while providing opportunities for
professional contacts and career networks that all-female clubs cannot dupli-
cate.139 In recognition of that fact, a growing number of states and localities
133. McAdoo, supra note 7, at 71-74; Wilson & Neckerman, Poverty and Family Structure, in
FIGHTING POVERTY: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T 232 (S. Danziger & D. Weinberg eds. 1986).
134. DeStefano & Colasanto, supra note 79, atB5, col. 5; see also I. PLECK, supra note 80, at 90-92;
1985 VIRGINIA SLiMs POLL, supra note 79 (56% of women preferred a marriage in which both shared
equally).
135. See infra text accompanying notes 202-10.
136. For example, according to Robert Strub of Los Angeles' California Club, the organization has
"no restrictions on any members except that it's a men's club. I don't consider that discrimination." As
quoted in Burns, The Exclusion of Women from Influential Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full
Equality, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321, 324 n.6 (1983); see also Reuben, Free Association Rights Said
Unclear After Rotary Ruling, L.A. Daily J., May 26, 1987, at I, col. 2.
137. Fairlie, Clothes, Clubs and the Trivialization of Civil Rights, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 1980, at C2,
col. 1.
138. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Rhode, Association and Assimilation,
81 Nw. U.L. REV. 106, 114-15 (1986).
139. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,625 (1984). See generally sources cited in Bums,
supra note 136; Rhode, supra note 138.
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have passed legislation banning sex discrimination by clubs over a certain size
that host business activities."4
Yet contrary to popular perceptions, we haven't solved the problem; we
have only moved it to a new level. Changes in formal policy do not guarantee
changes in social practice. Getting some women in the door does not get most
women to the right tables or to the less institutionalized networks of support,
guidance, and collegial contacts. Women's stories of exclusion and
marginalization reveal striking similarities across a wide variety of cultural
contexts. 4' Such subordination is compounded by ideologies of denial that
deny its existence and reinforce its dynamics.
As in other contexts, separate but equal is a contradiction in terms. Assump-
tions that make segregation seem necessary make equality impossible.'42
Men's and women's affiliations cannot be equated. Separatism imposed by
dominant groups carries different symbolic meanings and social consequences
than separatism chosen by subordinate groups. Given this nation's historic
traditions and power disparities, the exclusion of men from women's associa-
tions neither conveys inferiority nor perpetuates subordination. By contrast,
male separatism reinforces male advantage. A wide array of social science
research indicates that individuals who seem different are often disliked or
avoided in work-related contexts. 1 3 Women who don't "fit in" at clubhouse
lunches won't fare much better in other business contexts.
So too, the explanations male club members privately advance for sex-based
exclusions cast doubt on the egalitarian rhetoric they publicly proclaim. Female
members reportedly would alter club decor and decorum. If a man has a deal
to discuss he "wouldn't want to sit next to a woman fussing about how much
mayonnaise is in her chicken salad." '' Such stereotypes are self-perpetuating.
As long as no women are present, it is impossible to counteract the assumption
that men concentrate on mergers and women on mayonnaise.
Yet as with other feminist struggles, the danger is that the problem will be
too narrowly conceived. A preoccupation with formal access for women deflects
140. Club Doors Are Open, but Women Draw Back, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1988, at C1, col. 4; see
also Bums, supra note 136, at 395 (discussing legal initiatives).
141. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN, supra note 131, at 9-11; A. MIRANDE & E. ENRiQUEZ, supra
note 26, at 133-35; J. FERNANDEZ, supra note 99, at 88-94; Y. MOSES, supra note 99, at 18; M. WALSHOK,
BLUE COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS ON THE MALE FRONTIER 158, 168-70, 186-204 (1981); Burleigh, Black
Women Lawyers: Coping with Dual Discrimination, A.B.A. J., June 1, 1988, at 64; Deaux, Blue Collar
Barriers, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 287, 288 (1984); Epstein, Workplace Boundaries: Conceptions
and Creations, 56 SOC. RES. 571, 579-90 (1989); sources cited in Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988
DUKE L.L 1207, 1221-22.
142. A. DWORKIN, supra note 62, at 202.
143. Pettigrew & Martin, Shaping the Organization Context for Black American Inclusion, 43 . SOC.
ISSUES, No. 1, 1987, at 41, 58; Wilder & Allen, Effects of Social Categorization and Belief Similarity upon
Intergroup Behavior, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 281-83 (1974); see also Lipman-Blumen,
Toward a Homosocial Theory of Sex Roles: An Explanation of the Sex Segregation of Social Institutions,
in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE, supra note 127, at 15-16.
144. Trillin, Tampa, Florida: Four People Who Do Not Lunch at the University Club, NEW YORKER,
Apr. 11, 1977, at 101.
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attention from the class and racial barriers that constrain it. In attempting to
become "full members of the club," many individuals may lose the perspective
needed to challenge its underlying premises. Once inside, women have less
incentive to question the closed network of privilege that membership reflects
and reinforces.
If feminism is to express the underlying values that gave it birth, the
struggle cannot end with women's access to men's institutions. As examples
like Margaret Thatcher remind us, getting a woman into power is not the same
as empowering women. The challenge for contemporary feminists is to enable
women to ascend the hierarchy without losing their commitment to change it.
3. Athletics
Similar challenges arise in other contexts in which separate-but-equal
ideologies persist. Women's athletics offers a final case in point. Historically,
there has been little pretense about the equal. Assumptions about sexual differ-
ence and social roles made women seem unsuitable for sports and sports
unsuitable for women. 145 Social conventions initially limited female athletes
to activities that did not give rise to indelicate sweat or unfeminine rivalry."4
As women's physical education programs developed, their leaders argued for
models different from, but equal to men's-for goals less commercial and
competitive and more concerned with wide participation and positive social
interaction.1 47
In practice, those models succeeded more in establishing difference than
equality. By the late 1960's and the early 1970's, their limitations were widely
apparent. No athletic scholarships were available to women, interscholastic
programs were relatively rare, and many physical education programs stressed
activities that required few skills or resources (ringtossing and rhythmic hula-
hooping) or that promoted vicarious roles (cheerleading and pep clubs). 4
145. For assumptions that females were unfit for, or would be unsexed by, sports, see H. LENsKYJ,
OUT OF BOUNDS: WOMEN, SPORTS AND SEXUALITY 23, 100 (1986); K. MCCRONE, SPORT AND THE
PHYSICAL EMANCIPATION OF ENGLISH WOMAN 84, 135, 278-79 (1988) (describing concerns); Hargreaves,
Victorian Familism and the Formative Years of Female Sport, in FROM "FAIR SEX" TO FEMINISM 130 (J.
Mangan & R. Park eds. 1987).
146. See, e.g., P. BERLIN, J. FELSHIN, E. GERBER & W. WYRICK, THE AMERICAN WOMAN IN SPORT
4-10 (1974); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MORE HURDLES TO CLEAR 1-3 (1980); Spears, The Emer-
gence of Women in Sport, in WOMEN'S ATHLETICS 9 (B. Hoepner ed. 1974).
147. H. LENSKYJ, supra note 145, at 100; Chandler, The Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for
Women: The End of Amateurism in United States Intercollegiate Sports, in WOMEN IN SPORT: SOCIOLOGICAL
AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 5, 7-9 (1985); see also Birrell, The Woman Athlete's College Experience:
Knowns and Unknowns, I1 J. SPORT & Soc. ISSUES 82, 82-83 (1987).
148. See M. BOUTILIER & L. SAN GIOVANNI, THE SPORTING WOMAN 32-42 (1983); U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 146, at 1-2; Farrell, Many Women Link Anti-Sex Bias Law to Outstanding
Olympic Performances, Chron. Higher Educ., Aug. 29, 1984, at 31; sources cited infra note 156.
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Surveys of expenditures for boys' and girls' athletics found ratios ranging from
8:1 to 450:1.149
Passage of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act in 1972 brought limited prog-
ress. The Act prohibited sex discrimination in educational programs receiving
federal funds, but its application to athletics was somewhat murky.150 Con-
gressional sponsors made plain that they did not expect intercollegiate football
to be "desegregated." 5' What they were expecting remained less clear. Subse-
quent regulations required that institutions provide "equivalent opportunity" to
"accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes" but left
considerable room for argument about what constituted "equivalent."152
At institutions like Yale, administrators commonly assumed that sex-based
differences justified sex-based disparities, and displayed little interest in "ac-
commodating" female athletic abilities if it required diverting resources from
males. The consequence was a series of awkward turf battles, literally as well
as figuratively. The Yale women's field hockey team was less than enthusiastic
about its initial playing space in Parking Lot A, which often hosted cars and
debris as well as athletes. 153 The women's varsity tennis and crew teams
received space for practice but no nearby lavatory facilities. Polite protests
brought jovial reminders that members should be improving their skills not
powdering their noses. Underlying that banter was the latent assumption that
female athletes ought not to expect "equal reward for unequal talent."'-, To
get shower facilities at their boathouse, the women's crew team finally resorted
to a "Title IX strip." In preparation for a meeting with the Director of Athletics,
they printed Title IX in block letters on their bare backs. At a suitable moment
they disrobed before invited guests, including a photographer for The New York
Times. A picture ran the following day; the following year the boathouse had
women's showers.155
Although such discreet protests have resulted in substantial improvements,
equally substantial gender disparities remain. National surveys have revealed
continued discrimination in coaching, facilities, equipment, practice options,
149. D. TYACK & E. HANsOT, supra note 93, at 263; Warren, Justice and Gender in School Sports,
in WOMEN, PHILOSOPHY AND SPORT: A COLLECTON OF NEW ESSAYS 12 (B. Postow ed. 1983) [collection
as whole hereinafter WOMEN, PHILOSOPHY AND SPORT] (noting that it was not uncommon for coeducational
high schools and colleges to spend less than one percent of their athletic budgets on sports for women).
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988).
151. 117 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
152. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b)-(c). See generally M. BOUTILIER & L. SAN GIOVANNI, supra note 148,
at 171-72 (discussing inadequacies of Title IX); Birrell, supra note 147, at 83-86; Tokarz, Separate but
Unequal Educational Sports Programs: The Need for a New Theory of Equality, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.. 201, 211-17 (1985).
153. Warren, Women Athletes Tell of Fights for Respect, Yale Daily News, Nov. 30, 1989, at 3, col.
154. Levin, supra note 127, at 217.
155. Warren, supra note 153.
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competitive schedules, and related areas.156 Women of color confront further
obstacles in obtaining adequate resources and encouragement. 15 7 Moreover,
as feminists have long argued, the objective is not only to equalize athletic
opportunities, but also to transform them. Again, the principal problem is that
the problem may be too narrowly defined. Women are being asked to settle for
some pared-down version of models that men have established. Developing
alternatives that are more participatory and less exploitive presents a continuing
challenge. 158 The problem, thus reformulated, is how to gain equality without
relinquishing difference.
B. The Devaluation of Difference
An alternative way to understate gender inequality is to undervalue gender
difference. This approach defines equality in formal rather than substantive
terms and assumes that equal access is a sufficient guarantee of equal accep-
tance. Adherents of this position typically point to recent changes in gender
roles and formal rights and conclude, as did Britain's Lord Denning, that
"women's equality is complete."1 59
Ironically enough, women have long been excluded from employment,
educational, and political settings on the ground that they are different; once
admitted, the assumption has often been that they are the same. Female entrants
are expected to accommodate existing institutional norms; those norms are not
expected to change to accommodate women. The dominant view is similar to
that of Harvard Law School Dean Erwin Griswold when female students first
gained admission to the Law School in 1950. To Griswold, this development
did not seem "very important or very significant. Most of us have seen women
from time to time in our lives, and have managed to survive the shock.... I
think we can take it, and I doubt it will change the character of the School or
even its atmosphere to any detectable extent." 60
156. Birrell, supra note 147, at 86-91; Olson, Beyond Title IX: Toward an Agenda for Women and Sport
in the 1990s, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 105, 117-19 (1990); Tokarz, supra note 152, at 230; Diesenhouse,
More Women Playing, but Fewer Are Calling the Shots, N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1990, at D25, col. 4.
157. See BLACK WOMEN IN SPORTS 5, 9-10 (T. Green, et al. eds. 1981); M. BOUTILIER & L. SAN
GIOVANNI, supra note 148, at 18, 175; WOMEN's SPORTS FOUNDATION, THE WOMEN'S SPORTS FOUNDATION
REPORT: MINORITIES IN SPORTS (1989); Dunkle, Minority and Low-Income Girls and Young Women in
Athletics, 12 EQUAL PLAY (1985).
158. M. BOUTILIER & L. SAN GIOVANNI, supra note 148, at 247-48; C. MACKINNON, Women, Self-
Possession, and Sport, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 117, 117-24 (1987); Addelson, Equality and Competition:
Can Sports Make a Woman of a Girl?, in WOMEN, PHILOsOPHY AND SPORT, supra note 149, at 133, 149-55;
Lemaire, Women and Athletics: Toward a Physicality Perspective, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.L 121, 131-42
(1982); Olson, supra note 156, at 117-19.
159. As quoted in C. SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 12 (1989) (discussing women's
property rights).
160. Griswold, Developments at the Law School, 1950 HARV. L. Sct. Y.B. 10.
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1. Occupational Inequality
Such devaluations of difference help explain women's difficulties in em-
ployment contexts that have been structured primarily by and for men. Despite
a quarter-century's experience with equal opportunity legislation, women's
experience remains far from equal. Female workers have moved into male-
dominated professions but, as noted earlier, they are still dramatically
underrepresented at the highest levels of occupational status and financial
reward. For example, they hold about 13% of tenured academic posts, 6% of
the partnerships of large law firms, 5% of federal elective offices, and 3% of
executive positions at publicly traded corporations. 16' Female
underrepresentation in the highest paying skilled trade positions is similar, and
all of these disparities are greater for women of color. 62 The vast majority
of American employees remain within occupations or job classifications that
are gender segregated and gender stratified. 63 As a consequence, equal pay
mandates have not brought men and women significantly closer to obtaining
equal pay. Full-time female workers earn about 65% of the annual salary of
full-time male workers, the same as in 1955, and women of color again remain
at the bottom of the economic hierarchy." Gender-based pay disparities
persist within job categories even among workers with comparable creden-
tials. 161
161. Impellizzeri, Women, Minorities Made Gains at City Firms, MANHAT'TAN LAW., Mar. 1990, at
4 (15% of new partners are women although women's enrollment at law schools has climbed from 20%
in 1975 to 41% in 1989); see also A. MORRISON, R. WHrm & E. VAN VELSOR, supra note 9, at 5-6; G.
POWELL, supra note 102, at 78-79.
162. For barriers in blue collar work, see Hearings on Women in Nontraditional Jobs Before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 73
(1987); Women in the Work Force: Supreme Court Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education & Labor, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1986) (statement of
Cynthia Marano); Law, "Girls Can't Be Plumbers"-Affirmative Action for Women in Construction: Beyond
Goals and Quotas, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 45 (1989); Schultz, supra note 129, at 1827-32. For
statistics concerning women of color, see THE AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 7, at 381-86, 394-97; G.
POWELL, supra note 102, at 78-79; Malveaux, Gender Difference and Beyond: An Economic Perspective
on Diversity and Commonality Among Women, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVEs, supra note 38, at 226; Silver,
Few Women Minorities at the Top, Wash. Post, Aug. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (women constitute only 3%
of senior executives and racial minorities less than 1%, and little change has occurred between 1979 and
1989); Harlan, Women Still Earn Less than Men as Lawyers, Wall St. J., Apr. 21, 1989, at B 1, col. 1.; supra
note 4.
163. S. BIANCHI & D. SPAIN, AMERICAN WOMEN INTRANSrTON 180-88 (1986); B. RESKIN & P. ROOS,
JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUEs: EXPLAINING WOMEN'S INROADS INTO MALE OCCUPATIONS (1990); Bielby
& Baron, Undoing Discrimination: Job Integration and Comparable Worth, in INGREDIENTS, supra note
4, at 228; Hartmann, Roos & Treiman, supra note 130, at 3-4.
164. See Kleiman, Glass Ceilings for Black Women, San Francisco Examiner, Nov. 26, 1990, at BI,
col. 1, B5 (discussing survey findings of double jeopardy for Black women and noting that they make up
only 1% of all lawyers and 2% of all managers); sources cited supra notes 4 & 7.
165. Thornersupra note 99, at 94-95 (citing studies of pay disparities among women lawyers); Roman,
Women Beware: An MBA Doesn't Mean Equal Pay, BUS. WK., Oct. 29, 1990, at 57 (12% pay disparity
between men and women MBA graduates; substantial differences persist even when graduates are grouped
by industry); supra note 131.
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As was true a century earlier, the central problem is that too many indi-
viduals deny that any serious problem exists. Although recent surveys find
increasing perceptions of gender bias, a large percentage of the public still
doubts its significance. Between 40 and 50% of surveyed men do not believe
that women experience discrimination for top positions in government, business,
or the professions.166 Among lawyers, almost four-fifths of women but less
than half of men believe that there is gender bias in the bar.167
To many decisionmakers, gender inequalities in employment appear primari-
ly due to cultural lag or employee choice, and are not a matter for policy
initiatives. This perspective reflects a "now-you-see-them-now-you-don't view
of women workers. For positions carrying the greatest social status and econom-
ic rewards, female candidates are always in the pipeline but rarely in the pool
from which final selections are made. Adherents to this view are always
cheerful about its implications: gender roles are breaking down, women are
moving up, and full equality is just around the corner. At the moment, however,
for the positions at issue, women, especially women of color, are reportedly
unqualified or unavailable.1 61
Feminists who have listened to such upbeat but unchanging predictions over
extended periods tend to be rather less optimistic. At prevailing rates of change,
it could take between seventy-five and one hundred years to achieve a sexually
166. 1985 VIRGINIA SLIMS POLL, supra note 79, at I 1 (male sample: 48% government, 44% profession,
4 1% government positions).
167. ABA COMM'N ON WOMEN, supra note 131, at 2; see also Schafran, The Obligation to Intervene:
New Direction from the American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 53,
69 (1990) (noting low percentage of male judges who perceived gender bias compared with other observers);
Wickler, Judicial Education: An Overview, in 1989 PROc. NAT'L CONF. ON GENDER BIAS IN CTs. 53
(reporting consensus among participants in initial judicial education sessions that "gender had never affected
interactions in their courtrooms or chambers in any way whatsoever"); infra note 284 and accompanying
text.
168. For example, on Wall Street, although it took some firms 140 years to hire their first women and
the top ranking partners are still 99% male, a representative view is that "[tihe big investment banks have
been a little slow off the mark... [b]ut women are beginning to come into their own now, and you'll see
many more reaching the top in the next few years." A. FISHER, WALL STREET WOMEN 7 (1990). In
accounting, where women constitute 5.6% of the partners at the largest firms, the perception among many
male decisionmakers is that the problem will naturally correct itself as many more women are "pushing
their way up the pipeline." Berg, The Big Eight: Still a Male Bastion, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1988, at D7,
col. 1 (quoting Shaun O'Maliey, chairman of Price Waterhouse); Kristof, Women at Top-Almost, L.A.
Times, May 28, 1990, at D1, col. 2 (survey of highest paid executives at publicly held California firms
disclosed fewer than 50 women out of 2300; a representative response was: "We are getting the problem
straightened out at the bottom ... but it will take some time before those women find their ways to the
top.").
This ideology of denial is reinforced by individuals' tendencies to overgeneralize from particularly
memorable and therefore cognitively "available" occurrences. Women who depart from traditional roles
have special visibility; those who don't work out confirm traditional assumptions while those who succeed
encourage perceptions that bias has been eliminated. For discussion of the availability bias, see Markus &
Zajonc, The Cognitive Perspective in Social Psychology, in 1 HANDBOOK SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 137, 181-82
(3d ed. 1985); Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall & Reed, Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily
Informative, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 113, 128-29 (J. Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976); Tversky
& Kahneman, Availability: A HeuristicforJudging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
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balanced workforce.169 Moreover, as noted earlier, surveys of men and women
with comparable career investments find that women do not advance as far or
as fast.17 Something is happening between the pipeline and the pool that
requires further explanation.
When confronted with such disparities, many individuals' second line of
defense is a variation of the human capital model. If women have failed to
obtain certain positions, it has been because they are not making the necessary
sacrifices. Yet unlike disciples of separate but equal, these observers see
nothing natural or appropriate about women's different choices. Rather, the
assumption is that female employees should, and increasingly will, find ways
to succeed within current workplace structures.
Once again, my most direct encounter with such devaluations of gender
difference began in law school with summer job interviews. From a prominent
Chicago litigator I learned that there was no "woman problem" at his firm. One
of his sixty-odd partners was female, and she had no difficulties reconciling
her personal and professional obligations. Why just last year she had given birth
to her first child on a Friday and was back in the office the following Monday.
As increasing numbers of women have entered the professions, the novelty
of such accounts is wearing thin. Stories of women returning from maternity
leave faster than a speeding bullet are commonplace.17' At this point, the
record for reconciling productive and reproductive rhythms may have been set
by an attorney who drafted interrogatories during labor while timing her
contractions. If you're billing at six-minute intervals, why waste a moment?
For the "woman on the road to success," no detours from the standard
workplace obligations are advisable. According to one representative account,
you should never "make an issue out of being female," or "shirk late hours or
weekend projects." 72 Nor should you cook and tell; if you must go home to
prepare dinner you should avoid having "anyone know about it." Never should
you present yourself as "anything but a hard-driving capable lawyer."'
73
Above all, that author concludes, "Be yourself."'174
169. 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, COMPARABLE WORTH: ISSUE FOR THE 80's, at 109 (1984)
(statement of Joy Ann Grune).
170. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Brill, Labor Pains, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 1, 13-14 [hereinafter Brill, Labor
Pains]; Brill, The Woman Problem, AM. LAW., Feb. 1983, at 9; Bruck, The Impeccable Carla Hills, AM.
LAW., Apr. 1983, at 84-87; see also B. STAUKTBERG, PREGNANCY NINE TO FIVE: THE CAREER WOMAN'S
GUIDE TO PREGNANCY AND MOTHERHOOD 133-34 (1985) (describing triumphs of executive bedridden due
to pregnancy complications who managed to continue her job attired in tailored blue suit from her rented
hospital bed); Martin, Deconstructing Organizational Taboos: The Suppression of Gender Conflict in
Organizations, 1 ORGANIZATION Sci. 339 (1990) (describing executive who arranged her caesarean to permit
participation through closed circuit television in launching major product line from her hospital bed).
172. A. FISHER, supra note 168, at 71; Strachan, A Map for Women on the Road to Success, 70 A.B.A.
1. 94, 94-96 (1984).




For the woman whose self is uncomfortable with such advice, the alternative
is exclusion from leadership positions or relegation to a separate lower status
"mommy track." 75 The dominant assumption is that effective professional
performance requires "total commitment," which is incompatible with part-time
work, flexible schedules, and extended caretaking leaves. 176 Accommodation
of women's different family responsibilities appears to create problems of
coordination, duplication, overhead, and envy, and their price is often taken as
prohibitive.1r Resentment against "special treatment" remains common, and
what constitutes "special" is generally determined from a male reference point.
To many executives, business is "tough enough without having to deal with
a woman's life style."178 Female representation among upper level managers
does not necessarily improve the situation if it remains at token levels. Women
whose success has depended on internalizing dominant norms often believe that
if "I managed without parental leave, so can you."' 179
In the face of such assumptions, law has generally kept safely out of view.
Neither courts nor legislators have been willing to provide affirmative protec-
tion for childbirth, despite the obvious gender inequalities that result. Indeed
in its initial analysis of the issue, the Supreme Court reached the novel conclu-
sion that discrimination against pregnancy did not constitute discrimination
against women. According to a majority of Justices, medical insurance policies
that excluded childbirth did not even involve "gender as such"; employers were
simply drawing a distinction between, in the Court's now memorable phrase,
"pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." 0 Although legislative initiatives
have reversed that decision, they have left its basic premises unchallenged. The
nation's failure to ensure adequate caretaking leaves, flexible schedules, and
affordable childcare prevents an integration of workers' productive and repro-
175. Kingson, Women in the Law Say Path Is Limited by "Mommy Track," N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1988,
at 1, col. 5. Felice Schwartz has advocated separate, slower professional tracks for those women who wish
to accommodate family responsibilities. Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 67.
176. Beyette, Day-Care Dilemma, L.A. Tunes, Nov. 1, 1989, at El, col. 3; see also sources cited infra
notes 177-79.
177. On barriers to part-time work, see Brill, Labor Pains, supra note 171, at 13; Project, Law Firms
and Lawyers with Children: An Empirical Analysis of FamilylWork Conflict, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1263, 1275-
77, 1297 (1982); Rhode, supra note 53, at 1185-86; Rodgers & Rodgers, Business and the Facts of Family
Life, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 121, 127.
178. See also A. FISHER, supra note 168, at 13 (quoting objections such as, "What is this maternity-
leave crap? I never had maternity leave."); Hughes, Pregnant Professionals Face Pressures at Work as
Attitudes Toward Them Shift, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1991, at B6, col. 5 (describing law firm partners' attitude
of "[wle don't spend time with our families; why should you?").
179. Gardner, Bonding ime for the Family, Christian Sci. Monitor, June 22, 1990, at 13, col. 2
(quoting woman manager).
180. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134 (1976), quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
489 n.20 (1974).
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ductive lives.181 As long as women assume a disproportionate share of family
responsibilities, they will bear a disproportionate cost of those policy failures.
The result is a self-perpetuating cycle of devaluation in which equality in
formal rights masks inequality in daily experience. Many women with substan-
tial caretaking obligations have little choice but to drop out of the most de-
manding positions. Those who remain are likely to be single, childless, or
willing to minimize family roles.182 Under this Darwinian selection system,
the individuals with greatest influence on workplace structure are those with
the least personal understanding of its inadequacies.
2. EEOC v. Sears as a Case Study
The limits of current legal doctrine, and the dilemma they present for
contemporary feminists, are apparent in the growing number of discrimination
cases in which employers ascribe women's underrepresentation to women's
differences. 83 The most celebrated of these cases involved an Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission complaint against Sears, Roebuck and Company
charging that Sears had discriminated against women in high-paying commis-
sion sales positions. Although EEOC statistics reflected substantial
underrepresentation of women in such positions, the federal district court
accepted Sears' claim that such patterns were attributable to women's own
preferences, including women's reluctance to work irregular hours and their
discomfort with unfamiliar products and competitive compensation struc-
tures. 1
84
The case gained particular attention on several counts. Sears is the nation's
largest private-sector employer of women, and sales work, which is highly
gender segregated, is the occupation with the single highest gap in pay between
the sexes. 85 Moreover, the defendant relied on a prominent feminist scholar,
Rosalind Rosenberg, for support of its claim that women's differences explained
women's underrepresentation. Rosenberg testified that female employees often
have elevated traditional values of care and noncompetitiveness over opportuni-
ties for economic gain. The EEOC countered this claim with substantial rebuttal
evidence, including testimony by another equally prominent feminist historian,
181. See generally Dowd, Work and Family: Restructuring the Workplace, 32 ARIz. L REV. 431
(1990); Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analyses in
Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (1989); Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 177;
Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 381 (1984-85);
sources cited infra note 235.
182. See D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 175; sources cited supra notes 171 & 177; cf. Abrams, Gender
Discrimination and the Transformation of Work-place Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1239 (1989) (noting
absence of women among policymakers).
183. Schultz, supra note 129, at 1766-77 (courts in almost half of 54 reported cases between 1972 and
1989 considering issue of sex segregation attributed it to women's work preferences).
184. EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1308-15 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
185. Milkman, Women's History and the Sears Case, 12 FEMINIST STuD. 375 (1986).
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Alice Kessler-Harris, concerning women's interest in nontraditional employment
alternatives. Kessler-Harris' testimony stressed the variability in jobs and
schedules that women have historically accepted, the ability of economic
incentives to counter gender socialization, and the extent to which job segrega-
tion has traditionally been based on employer practices rather than employee
choices.1 86
The Sears case highlighted crucial issues in feminist theory in a forum that
was singularly ill-suited to address them. In insisting on simple causal explana-
tions for complex employment patterns, prevailing doctrine distorted the
controversies it sought to resolve. To determine whether Sears' practices did
or did not "cause" women's underrepresentation, counsel pushed both
Rosenberg and Kessler-Harris to present their historical interpretations as
statements of fact.187 Broad generalizations about all women were marshaled
to explain relatively small statistical disparities among a particular group of
women--employees interested in Sears sales positions.'88 Although the district
judge seemed aware of the dangers of such generalizations, he applied his
insight selectively. He criticized Kessler-Harris for her inability to quantify how
many women illustrated the tendencies she described, but he did not subject
Rosenberg's assertions to the same scrutiny. 9
In effect, the Sears case caught feminists in a longstanding dilemma: either
emphasizing or denying women's difference risks amplifying the disadvantages
that follow from it.190 During the controversy following her trial testimony,
Rosenberg criticized her opponents for insisting that employer discrimination
was the only significant cause of gender disparities. In her view, the problem
reflected in Sears was not the district court's "frank recognition that differences
exist, but rather [that] many American[s were] unwilling to face those differ-
ences and do something about them."''
Yet, among those Americans were Sears managers who both relied on
gender stereotypes in hiring decisions and declined to make workplace adjust-
ments that would avoid penalizing women for their distinctive role. For exam-
186. See Hall, Women's History Goes to Trial: EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck and Company, 11 SIGNS 751
(1986); Scott, Deconstructing Equality-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for
Feminism, 14 FEMINIST STUD. 33,40 (1988); see also Haskell & Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert
Witnessing: Historians and the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1629 (1988); Kessler-Harris, Academic Freedom
and Expert Witnessing: A Response to Haskell and Levinson, 67 TEX. L. REv. 429 (1988).
187. 1. SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLMCS OF HISTORY 169-70 (1988). Any effort to introduce
complexity or controversy served to undermine witness' testimony. Kessler-Harris, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck and Company: A Personal Account, 25 FEMINIST REv. 46, 61
(1987).
188. J. Scorr, supra note 187, at 169-70; Haskell & Levinson, supra note 186, at 1634-36, 1653-57.
189. J. ScoTr, supra note 187, at 170; Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797,817-18
(1989).
190. M. MINOW, MAKING ALLTHE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 19-23,
40-42, 56-60, 217-19, 375-77 (1990); D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 180-81, 306-13; J. ScOwt, supra note
187, at 170.
191. Rosenberg, What Harms Women in the Workplace, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at A23, col. 1.
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ple, one defense witness explained that women did not hold retail sales posi-
tions because they didn't like "going outside when it's snowing, raining or
whatever." '192 To predict effectiveness in commission sales, Sears relied on
tests that measured prospective employees' "vigor" by reference to their views
towards boxing, wrestling, hunting, and swearing.193 Despite the company's
professed commitment to affirmative action objectives, its management failed
to explore policy initiatives that have in fact helped realize such objectives in
comparable workplace settings: flexible schedules; childcare assistance; and
special recruitment, training, and support programs for women in nontraditional
occupations."9 If, as Sears emphasized, women generally didn't seek commis-
sion positions, neither did Sears actively seek women for those positions.195
Similar attitudes have been apparent in other employment discrimination
cases in which courts have accepted gender stereotypes as an explanation for
gender segregation. The unattractiveness of certain traditionally male occupa-
tions for female employees has been accepted as an inalterable "fact of
life." '196 Decisionmakers have often viewed "sexist values," not employment
practices, as solely responsible for gender stratification. 197 Yet this perspective
overlooks the vast array of data indicating that women's employment preferenc-
es are highly responsive to employment opportunities and that workplace
cultures help shape female aspirations and achievements. 98
In his closing argument, Sears' attorney urged the court to reject testimony
by the government's "Ph.D.'s" in favor of "common sense"; no one could
reasonably believe that a "monopsony of white men . . . get[s] up every
morning trying to find a way to discriminate against their wives, their daugh-
ters, their mothers, their sisters." '199 The problem for contemporary feminism
lies in such caricatures of the problem-in assumptions that employers' discrim-
ination is either responsible for all gender disparities or for none at all, that the
sexes are either the same or different. The dynamics of gender cannot be
reduced to such simple dualistic frameworks. Nor can women afford to replicate
the failures of the protective labor era; feminists must not end up fighting each
other over the extent of difference rather than uniting to challenge the disadvan-
tages that difference perpetuates.
192. As quoted in Milkman, supra note 185, at 382; see also Wiener, Exchange, NATION, Oct. 26,
1985, at 410; Wiener, Women's History on Trial, NATION, Sept. 7, 1985, at 178.
193. See sources cited supra note 192.
194. Schultz, supra note 129, at 1789-93; Hall, supra note 186, at 767-79 (written testimony of Alice
Kessler-Harris).
195. See C. BACCHI, SAME DIFFERENCE: FEMINISM AND SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 119 (1990).
196. EEOC v. Mead Foods, 466 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Olda. 1977); see also EEOC v. Kom Indus., 17
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) No. 74-1029, at 954, 959 (D.S.C. 1978) (no obligation for defendant to "waste
its time and money trying to find women of extraordinary size, strength and stamina"), aff'd and remanded,
662 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1981).
197. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Dallas, 483 F. Supp. 54, 61 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
198. See evidence summarized in Schultz, supra note 129, at 1815-32; Hall, supra note 186 (citing
testimony of Kessler-Harris).
199. Milkman, supra note 185, at 385 (quoting Charles Morgan).
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IV. THE DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY
A final version of the no-problem problem involves interpretative strategies
that acknowledge gender injustice but deny responsibility for redressing it.
These approaches take several forms. The first is to adopt a frame of reference
that keeps the issue safely out of reach. Adherents acknowledge gender bias
as a "serious problem," but remain confident that whatever happens in their
home or workplace is not an instance of it. A related form of selective percep-
tion occurs among individuals who can see their connection to the problem but
not to its solution. From this perspective, all plausible remedies lie elsewhere:
government leaders look to employers, employers look to government, both
look to families, husbands look to wives, and wives too often just stop looking.
This last response reflects a final form of denial, which again acknowledges
the problem, but rejects the possibility of any solution. However desirable in
theory, the feminist agenda is simply unfeasible or unaffordable in practice. All
of these approaches leave adherents in much the same place: gender inequality
is a problem, but not their problem.
A. Relocating the Problem
1. Strategies of Resistance
Strategies for distancing gender bias operate somewhat differently among
men and women. For many men, the social unacceptability of sexism, coupled
with the inconvenience of eliminating it, have encouraged various techniques
of self-deception. One common approach is to trivialize the issue; harassing,
disrespectful, or condescending behavior is often dismissed as insignificant,
while women who take offense are viewed as humorless and oversensitive.2M
An alternative strategy is to find ways of pledging allegiance to the feminist
cause that do not involve living with its implications.
One of the most costless techniques is to assert virtue by association. Men
who have learned not to claim political correctness because "some of their best
friends" are minorities feel no comparable pangs about basking in the liberation
of their wives or daughters. If they have encouraged their spouses' decision to
work, or their daughters' participation in Little League, surely no further
evidence of enlightenment should be necessary. This is not to discount the
importance of family experiences in increasing sensitivity to sexism.2' But
200. ABA CoM'N ON WOMEN, supra note 131, at 8-10; Schafran, supra note 167, at 57-68.
201. Neither should the effect of such experiences be overstated. See Crosby & Herek, Male Sympathy
with the Situation of Women: Does Personal Experience Make a Difference?, 42 . Soc. ISSUES, No. 2,
1986, at 55, 59-65 (finding no correlation between men's attitudes about sex discrimination and employment
status of their wives or mothers or experiences of women in their own lives, but noting that men in high
prestige occupations were more aware and disapproving of such discrimination than those in lower status
occupations).
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it is to suggest that too many men view rhetorical support for women's aspira-
tions as an adequate substitute for more tangible personal and political commit-
ments.
For example, the skewed allocation of domestic responsibilities reveals wide
disparities between many husbands' professed principles and daily practices.
Women continue to assume about 70% of the domestic responsibilities in an
average household and employed wives spend twice as much time on family
obligations as employed men.2 2 Yet many husbands find ways to deny or
rationalize their lighter burden. A recent in-depth survey of dual career families
by Arlie Hochschild with Ann Machung illustrates a range of strategies. One
is to revise reality in such a way that women's extra tasks appear matters of
personal choice, not joint responsibility. Rather than accept an equal division
of cleaning, cooking, or childcare obligations, some men redefine their share
as unnecessary; they don't mind unmade beds or frozen pizza, and their infants
will do just fine with extra time among their "friends" at daycare.0 3 The
result for many women is that "I do my half, I do half of [my husband's] half,
and the rest doesn't get done."2'
A related strategy is to divide tasks so that some shares are "more equal"
than others. One couple in Hochschild's and Machung's survey had settled on
such a division for their household: the wife took responsibility for chores
connected with upstairs and the husband for the downstairs and the dog. In their
split level, the downstairs consisted of the garage.2 5 Men's shares are also
more likely to consist of enjoyable tasks or those that can be scheduled at
convenient times: playing with infants rather than changing their diapers or
coping with their illnesses. 206 When unexpected domestic problems arise,
many men substitute emotional for practical support. The wife's role is to solve
the problem while the husband's is to cheer her on from the sidelines with
advice such as: "Handle it the best way you can honey.... I'm a hundred
percent behind you."20 7
Such strategies build on more general cognitive tendencies involving the
choice of reference groups. Where gender appears to be a relevant characteris-
202. See supra note 80 and accompanying text; see also B. BERGMAN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE
OF WOMEN 261-69 (1986); P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, HOUSEHOLDS, EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER: A
SocIAL, ECONOMIC, AND DEMOGRAPHIC VIEW 94-99 (1986); M. GEERKEN & W. GOVE, AT HOME AND
AT WORK: THE FAMILY'S ALLOCATION OF LABOR 87-96 (1983); A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra
note 80, at 21, 271-73; . PLECK, supra note 80, at 140-55; surveys summarized in D. RHODE, supra note
3, at 174; Wallis, supra note 8.
203. A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra note 80, at 202, 230-31, 260.
204. Id. at 259; see also 1. PLECK, supra note 80, at 92 (suggesting that many wives may be willing
to accept their husbands' unequal share of domestic responsibilities because of difficulties and conflict
involved in getting them to perform tasks competently).
205. A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra note 80, at 43.
206. See id. at 3-9; Coleman, The Division of Household Labor: Suggestions for Future Empirical
Consideration and Theoretical Development, 9 . FAM. ISSUES 132 (1988). See generally sources cited supra
note 202.
207. A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra note 80, at 90.
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tic, most individuals compare themselves to members of their own sex.208 In
assessing domestic burdens, husbands typically find it convenient to view
themselves in relation to other husbands rather than to their wives.' °9 From
this perspective, unequal divisions of labor become easy to rationalize since
they remain the norm rather than the exception. Once the problem of
work/family conflict is conceptualized from a male reference point, the addi-
tional pressures facing women no longer seem unfair. As one husband in the
Hochschild-Machung study pointed out, he did as much as many men. Although
those other men's wives may have had fewer workplace obligations, why
should he suffer just because his wife had chosen a demanding career?210
2. Relative Deprivation
Similar comparative strategies operate among women with similar results.
A wide gap remains between many individuals' objective experience and their
subjective perception of gender inequalities. For example, despite their grossly
disproportionate share of domestic burdens, only about a quarter of recently
surveyed wives reported that their husbands did less than their "fair share"
around the home.21' Similarly, in studies in which a majority of women ac-
knowledge gender discrimination in employment to be a problem, or where
objective evidence points to that conclusion, most individuals do not believe
that they personally have been victims.21 2 Autobiographical accounts reveal
similar patterns: female authors will often recount numerous instances of
unequal treatment in work and family spheres while maintaining that they have
faced "no distinctive problems" on account of their sex.21 3
208. See F. CROSBY, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND WORKING WOMEN 94 (1982) (women typically
compare themselves to other women and 70% of females surveyed felt they were better off than other
women); Major, supra note 105, at 101-05; Suls, Comparison Processes in Relative Deprivation: A Life-Span
Analysis, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 116, at 95,97. For discussion
of gender segregation in employment, see supra text accompanying notes 162-65.
209. A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra note 80, at 51.
210. Id. at 40.
211. Cowan, supra note 80, at A14, col. 4; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. For women's
greater burdens, see sources cited supra note 202.
212. See F. CROSBY, supra note 208, at 13-18, 65-67, 94-115; Jackson, Relative Deprivation and the
Gender Wage Gap, 45 J. SOC. ISSUES, No. 4, 1989, at 117, 119-20; Belkin, supra note 78, at 1 (70% of
women who worked fultime felt women had equal or better chance of promotion where they worked). For
example, in the Virginia Slims Opinion Poll, a majority of women felt that they had an equal chance with
their male colleagues concerning salary and promotion; only 25% felt that their colleagues did not look on
them as an equal. 1985 VIRGINIA SLIMS POLL, supra note 79, at 27-28; see also Sambom, Many Americans
Find Bias at Work, Nat'l L.J., July 16, 1990, at 1, cols. 1-2 (78% of surveyed Americans indicated that they
believed some, all, or most employers are guilty of discriminatory practices, but only one-quarter claimed
to have experienced such discrimination, and only 8% of those reported gender bias). On women's lack
of self-identification or involvement as feminists, see supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
213. See Hochschild, Making It: Marginality and Obstacles to Minority Consciousness, in WOMEN
AND SuccEss, THE ANATOMY OF ACHIEVEMENT 194, 195 (R. Knudsen ed. 1974) (quoting Mildred
Dresselhaus, one of few women in electrical engineering at MIT, who also reported that her male adviser
had been totally unsympathetic and had provided no assistance with her thesis); see also F. CROSBY, supra
note 208, at 13-18, 65-67, 94-115.
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In explaining this denial among women, theories of relative deprivation
provide some assistance. The central premise of such theories is that felt
grievances are a function not simply of objective circumstances but of cognitive
and emotional factors. While theorists differ on the importance they ascribe to
particular factors, those considered most likely to foster a sense of deprivation
are: a desire for some object; a perception that others in a comparable reference
group have it; a sense of entitlement to it; an absence of self-blame for the
failure to possess it; and a sense that in the past the object was attainable and
that in the future it will not be.2" 4 These conditions are, in turn, influenced
by the structural and ideological forces that underpin gender roles.
As a threshold matter, sex-based socialization patterns may diminish
women's desire for the same occupational rewards or limited domestic roles
that are available to men. Most research suggests that women have placed lower
priority than men on objective forms of recognition in employment such as
money, status, or power and have attached higher importance to relational
concerns such as opportunities to help or work with others.2 Since many
women also believe that caring for a home and children are their most reward-
ing pursuits, their disproportionate assumption of domestic burdens may not
always feel unjust." 6 Women's perceptions of fairness are also influenced
by their reliance on same-sex reference groups in contexts in which gender
appears relevant. 217 As long as most family responsibilities continue to be
typed as "women's work" and the American paid (and unpaid) labor force
remains highly gender segregated, many women will fail to make gender com-
parisons that would reveal gender hierarchy.
Other structural factors encourage such selective perception. Historical and
social science research makes clear that individuals who feel powerless to affect
214. See F. CROSBY, supra note 208, at 7, 22-23. For overviews of relative deprivation, see generally
W. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1966); 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND
SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 116. These theories build on longstanding observations about human
discontent and the frequent gap between subjective perceptions and objective conditions. Aristotle hypothe-
sized that we could predict individuals' satisfaction from their neighbors' conditions, and Marx described
how a house became a hovel when a palace was constructed next door. F. CROSBY, supra note 208, at 16.
According to some theorists, the factors noted in the text operate differently in different contexts and
cultures, and not all are preconditions to resentment. See F. CROSBY, supra note 208, at 157-60; Crosby,
Muehrer & Loewenstein, Relative Deprivation and Explanation; Models and Concepts, in 4 RELATIVE
DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 116, at 17, 19, 25.
Under a similar "equity" theory, deprivation assertediy results when an individual's ratio of rewards
to investments and costs appears smaller than others' ratios. See G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS
ELEMENTARY FORMS 248-57 (1974); E. WALSTER, G. WALSTER & E. BERSCHEID, EQUlTY: THEORY AND
RESEARCH (1978); Wheeler & Zuckerman, Commentary, in SOCIAL COMPARISON PROCESSES: THEORETICAL
AND EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 335, 351-54 (J. Suls & R. Miller eds. 1977); Equity Theory: Toward a
General Theory of Social Interaction, 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY (L. Berkowitz
& E. Walster eds. 1976).
215. See supra text accompanying note 128.
216. S. EVANS, supra note 60, at 226 (1975 Harris Survey found that 51% of women believed that
taking care of home and children was more rewarding than having a job); supra text accompanying notes
65 & 79.
217. See supra note 208.
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their subordinate situation tend to avoid comparisons that suggest its unfair-
ness.218 Such dynamics inhibit a sense of injustice based on race, as well as
gender. The point was well illustrated by an organizer for an impoverished
Black community who reported being "very content" with her poverty-line
wages since she had more than her neighbors. When asked about white resi-
dents in a wealthy area clearly visible from her front porch, the organizer
explained, "[M]y life is here. I don't think about them. 219
Perceptions of entitlement and blame can also discourage perceptions of a
problem.' Stereotypes about the quality and value of women's work often
diminish individuals' sense of their own merit.221 As research on cognition
makes evident, it is generally easier to conclude that "just desserts" have been
violated for abstract groups than for particular individuals, including one-
self. For women to see themselves as victims imposes other costs as well.
Faced with a potential loss of efficacy and self-esteem, together with the
unpleasantness of identifying a perpetrator of injustice, many individuals prefer
to revise their sense of merit or blame.m
A final factor influencing women's sense of injustice involves their expecta-
tions. Individuals are most likely to feel aggrieved when they believe that a
desired object or status was available in the past and will not be in the fu-
ture." A central problem in generating perceptions of a problem among
women is that their opportunities have generally been expanding. According
to contemporary opinion polls, most individuals believe that the situation for
women will continue to improve.' For gender issues affecting the broadest
segments of the public-employment, family obligations, and sexual abuse-the
future looks more promising than the past. Except on questions of abortion,
218. B. MOORE, INJUSTICE: THE SOCIAL BASES OF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT 455-59, 471-72 (1978);
Martin & Murray, Distributive Injustice and Unfair Exchange, in EQUITY THEORY, supra note 116, at 169;
Wills, supra note 117, at 264-68; see also F. PARKIN, supra note 11, at 60-67.
219. As quoted in Martin, The Tolerance of Injustice, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRiVATION AND SOCIAL
COMPARISON, supra note 116.
220. See text accompanying supra notes 12-13; sources cited supra notes 108, 116, 214 & 218; text
accompanying infra note 226; infra note 230 and accompanying text.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 115; infra text accompanying notes 226-32.
222. As Crosby explains, the concept of deserving presupposes categorical comparison. At its core is
the belief that like cases should be treated alike, which assumes a classification into groups that can be
compared along relevant dimensions. The more we know about particular individuals and their unique set
of attributes and behavior, the more difficult it is to consider them as representatives of particular groups.
F. CROSBY, supra note 208, at 161.
223. Id.; K. BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 27,36,
52-53, 94-99 (1988); Olson & Hazelwood, Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison: An Integrative
Perspective, in 4 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL COMPARISON, supra note 116, at 1, 8-9 (individuals
tend to process information and select reference groups in ways that will validate their own abilities and
enhance their own self-esteem); see also Unger & Sussman, "I and Thou": Another Barrier to Social
Change?, 14 SEX ROLES 629, 630 (1986) (discussing individuals' greater awareness of discrimination against
others than against themselves and relating it to people's greater tendency to attribute personal efficacy and
control to themselves than to others).
224. See F. CROSBY, supra note 208, at 22; T. GURR, WHY MEN REBEL 317-55 (1970).
225. See 1985 VIRGINIA SLIMS POLL, supra note 79, at 1; 1980 VIRGINIA SLIMS POLL, supra note 79,
at 18-19; Belkin, supra note 78.
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where threats of curtailment have mobilized large numbers of women, a sense
of complacency prevails. Most contexts in which women's situation has demon-
strably worsened have involved discrete subgroups, typically those already
disadvantaged by class, race, or ethnicity. As for issues affecting those groups,
such as the feminization of poverty, the perception among many women, as
well as men, has been that it's "not my problem."
B. Relocating the Solution
1. Victimizing the Victim
A second way of distancing gender inequality as a problem is to relocate
responsibility for causing or addressing it. One common approach is to blame
the victim, a tendency reinforced by the "just world" assumptions noted
earlier.226 Just as members of subordinate racial and economic groups are
presumed to deserve their status,227 women are often held accountable for the
inequality they experience.
For example, sexual abuse will appear less threatening if women are
responsible for provoking or inviting it. In clinical experiments, individuals will
often incorrectly recall facts about victims' complicit or provocative conduct
in order to avoid concluding that an innocent person has suffered.' That
same tendency is apparent in contexts such as sexual harassment, domestic
violence, and rape. Despite federal research suggesting that about 85% of all
working women will at some point experience workplace harassment, many
observers persist in believing that the problem only confronts employees "who
ask for it." 9 Under similar reasoning, rapes are often attributed to women's
seductive clothing or reckless conduct.?0 In one recent Wisconsin case, the
226. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
227. ROPER CENTER FOR PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH, ABC-WASHINGTON POST RACE RELATIONS 1981-
89 (Oct. 3, 1989) discussed in Morin, Fewer Whites Voicing Racial Bias; Poll Comparison Suggest
Moderation of Attitudes Toward Blacks, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1989, at A18, col. 1 (56% of whites surveyed
in 1989 agreed that many of problems facing Blacks today "are brought on by blacks themselves," and 43%
agreed that Blacks lagged behind whites economically because most Blacks "don't have the motivation or
will-power to pull themselves out of poverty"). For discussion of comparable biases on class issues, see
M. KATZ, supra note 7, at 6-16.
228. See M. LERNER, supra note 12, at 21 (citing studies); ApsIer & Friedman, supra note 13; Comer
& Laird, supra note 13, at 93; Wortnan, Causal Attributions and Personal Control, in 1 NEW DIRECTIONS
IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 23-28 (J. Harvey & W. Ickes eds. 1976). So too, in experimental studies in
which a victim receives painful electric shocks, observers who have no opportunity to prevent the shocks
tend to deny their magnitude. Despite information to the contrary, subjects will maintain that the shocks
are mild or that the victim knew what she was getting into and assumed the risk. M. LERNER, supra note
12, at 52.
229. N. MCGLEN & K. O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S RIGHTS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY IN THE NINE-
TEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 186 (1983) (quoting Phyllis Schiafly); see also D. RHODE, supra note
3, at 232-35.
230. See G. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
95-107, 208-26 (1989); J. MARSH, A. GEIST & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMrTS OF LAW REFORM 61
(1982); REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 68-73 (1986) [hereinafter
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trial judge even managed to lay blame on a five-year-old child whom he
characterized as an "unusually promiscuous young lady."l Law enforcement
and judicial officials have similarly viewed victims of domestic violence as
accountable for their own abuse: "[A]II they have to do is get out of the
house." 2 Why women should be the ones to leave, how they can support
themselves and their children, and what will prevent further physical retaliation
are questions discreetly overlooked.
Such responses compound women's injury by discounting its existence.
Many individuals are victimized twice: first by sexual abuse and then by the
process of proving it. Even decisionmakers who acknowledge the problem have
been more disposed to praise than subsidize the necessary responses. Resources
for rape crisis centers and battered women's programs remain grossly inade-
quate while decisionmakers in each branch of government perennially defer to
those in other branches to find "creative funding" for such initiatives.33
2. Pay Equity
This latter response points to a related strategy of denial that locates the
problem everywhere or anywhere else. A representative case study involves pay
equity. In general, the concept encompasses various job evaluation strategies
that identify characteristics relevant to compensation (such as skill, responsibili-
ty, and working conditions) and then evaluate existing salary levels in light of
those characteristics.'M Such techniques have frequently revealed the under-
valuation of women's work noted earlier, and highlighted comparisons such as
childcare attendants who earn less than parking lot attendants and nurses who
NEW YORK TASK FORCE]; Aiken, Differentiating Sex from Sex: The Male Irresistible Impulse, 12 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357, 376 (1984); Spencer, Sexual Assault: The Second Victimization, in WOMEN
IN THE COURTS (1987). For a recent illustration, see Grizzard, What Do They Mean, Advertising for Sex,
Bristol Herald Courier/Virginia-Tennessean, Nov. 2, 1989, at 8B, col 1 (discussing rape acquittal where
jurors believed that victim "advertised for sex" by wearing mini skirt without undergarments).
231. As quoted in Schafran, Documenting Gender Bias in the Courts: The Task Force Approach, 70
JUDICATURE 280,284 n.17 (1987); see also REPORT OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT GENDER BIAS STUDY
COM'N 140-41 (1990) (reporting widespread belief that sexual molestation victims precipitate abuse).
232. Schafran, supra note 231, at 283-84; see also MARYLAND SPECIAL JOINT COMM., GENDER BIAS
IN THE COURTS 2-3, 9 (1989); NEW YORK TASK FORCE, supra note 230, at 68-73; Waits, supra note 2,
at 299-301, 311-15.
233. See B. DECKARD, THE WOMEN's MOVEMENT 439-40 (3d ed. 1983); U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 81-90
(1982); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT 60 (1984).
234. See infra note 246.
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earn less than tree trimmers.?35 These strategies have also aroused heated
opposition, often by critics who acknowledge gender bias as a problem, but
deny any obligation to respond.
Once again, Yale's experience has been no exception. That became apparent
in a 1984 union organizing campaign, which marked the first successful effort
to unionize predominantly female clerical and technical staff at a major uni-
versity. In part because they had not been organized, skilled women were
underpaid in comparison both to unskilled males within the university and to
skilled women in similar positions outside it. Confronted by these depressed
wage rates and the hardship they presented, especially for female-headed
households, the University Provost responded, "I know that one can't live the
way one would like to, or the way one would like one's family to live, on a
Yale clerical and technical salary. That's a national problem, which Yale can't
be expected to solve. ''236
Who exactly is responsible for solving it remains unclear. Federal legislators
have been unwilling to send enforcement officials "trooping around all over
the country.., harassing business with their various interpretations of the term
'comparable.' ,2 Major governmental and business leaders have painted pay
equity as absurd or abhorrent, the "looniest idea since Looney Tunes," or an
invitation to runaway inflation and a centrally planned economy.238 Most
courts have been equally unenthusiastic. As one trial judge explained:
We're confronted with a history which I have no hesitancy at all in
finding has discriminated unfairly and improperly against women. But
Congress did not, in my judgment, decide that we were going to roll
aside all history and that the Federal Courts should take over the job
of leveling out centuries of discrimination....
235. See Lewin, Small Tots, Big Biz, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1989, § 6 (Magazine), at 30, col. 1; sources
cited supra notes 108-12; see also Steinberg, The Social Construction of Skill, in WORK AND OCCUPATIONS
(forthcoming) (school librarians paid less than groundskeepers and occupations such as dog pound attendant
and parking lot attendant are rated as more difficult and therefore as deserving higher compensation than
childcare and nursery school worker). See generally Phillips & Taylor, Sex and Skill: Notes Towards a
Feminist Economics, 6 FEMINIST REV. 79 (1980) (arguing that skill is "ideological category" imposed on
work by virtue of power of particular groups of workers and noting that hierarchical classifications of male
and female jobs often bear little relationship to workers' ability or training).
236. As quoted in Taylor, Women Workers and the Yale Strike, 11 FEMINIST STUD. 465, 475 (1985).
237. 108 CONG. REc. 14,768 (1962) (remarks of Rep. Landrum on Equal Pay Act of 1962); see also
1963 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 690-92.
238. Lawson, Women in State Jobs Gain in Pay Equity, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1985, at C12, col. 2
(quoting Civil Rights Commission Chairman Clarence Pendleton, Jr.); see also M. LEVIN, supra note 71,
at 145-46; Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728,
1729 (1986) (quoting Ronald Reagan dismissing concept of comparable worth as "cockamamie idea");
Remick & Steinberg, Technical Possibilities and Political Realities: Concluding Remarks, in COMPARABLE
WORTH AND WAGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 105, at 285, 289-90 (discussing criticism that comparable
worth will destroy free market as basic wage-setting mechanism).
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... If we are to have.., the Big Brother looking over our shoulder
who is going to dictate our day-to-day ways of life... [i]t's not going
to come, at least, from this court.? 9
From this perspective, if women workers have a problem with current wage
rates, the solution lies with those women.m If female nurses think they're
underpaid relative to male sign painters, let them paint signs.
In fact, sign painting is part of what women need to do, although not as a
full-time occupation. The most successful comparable worth strategies in this
country generally have depended on the mobilization of women through
collective bargaining and legislative lobbying. Pay equity can create a powerful
organizing issue by raising women's expectations, self-esteem, and bargaining
skills? 1t The Yale struggle is a representative example. Claims about the
undervaluation of female-dominated jobs helped unionize clerical and technical
staff, mobilize a strike, and secure substantial raises as a consequence. 4 2 A
growing number of comparable worth initiatives at the state and municpal levels
have similarly resulted in modest gains for women and minorities. 3 Such
gains have come without triggering the major inflation, inefficiency, and
unemployment that critics have predicted.'
The point of these strategies is to locate at least partial responsibility for
remedying gender bias with decisionmakers who have, in fact, the power to do
so. In this effort, the law can play only a limited role, but a larger one than
many opponents have acknowledged. Courts may not be an ideal forum in
which to resolve arguments about the inherent worth of particular jobs? 5
Such evaluations depend on essentially political determinations about how to
categorize various job characteristics and how to rank particular jobs in terms
of such characteristics. These are questions on which reasonable decisionmakers
often disagree. Since judges have no principled basis for resolving such dis-
putes, they are generally better addressed in more representative legislative or
239. Lemons v. City & County of Denver, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) No. 76-W-1156, at 906,
908, 914 (1978); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 999 (1988) (courts are less
competent than employers to structure compensation practices).
240. See Manufacturers Group Hits Comparable Worth in Pay, L.A. Times, Nov. 24, 1984, § 1, at
24, col. 1 (quoting Alexander B. Trowbridge, President, National Association of Manufacturers).
241. See L ACKER, DoING COMPARABLE WORTH: GENDER, CLASS, AND PAY EQUITY (1989); S. EVANS
& B. NELSON, WAGE JUSTICE: COMPARABLE WORTH AND THE PARADOX OF TEcHNOCRATIC REFORM
(1989); Steinberg, Radical Challenges in a Liberal World: The Mixed Success of Comparable Worth, I
GENDER & SOC'Y 466 (1987).
242. Taylor, supra note 236, at 479-82; Drogin, Comparable Worth at Center of Yale Strike, L.A.
Ties, Nov. 18, 1984, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
243. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON PAY EQUrIY, PAY EQUITY: AN IssuE OF RACE, ETHNICrTY,
AND SEX 86-104 (1987); Clauss, Comparable Worth--The Theory, Its Legal Foundation, and the Feasibility
of Implementation, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 7, 90-95 (1986); Rothchild, Pay Equity-The Minnesota
Experience, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 209, 214-15 (1986).
244. See generally sources cited supra notes 241 & 243. The typical cost of comparable worth reforms
has been around 5-10% of total wage rates phased in over a number of years. Hartmann, Comparable Worth
and Women's Economic Independence, in INGREDIENTS, supra note 4, at 256.
245. Rhode, supra note 141, at 1221-22; see also infra note 246.
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collective bargaining contexts. 6 Not all pay equity claims, however, involve
issues of inherent worth. Some seek only to ensure that employers are con-
sistent in implementing their own chosen compensation criteria and evaluation
systems, irrespective of the racial or gender composition of particular occupa-
tions or the pay at which individuals are willing to work. 7
Yet in this, as in other contexts, equality in formal requirements does not
necessarily ensure equality in social practice. Unless efforts are made to involve
workers and build coalitions among them, comparable worth can become a
means of slightly reformulating but then rigidifying wage hierarchies. In the
implementation of some pay equity initiatives, job evaluation schemes have
become bargaining tools that managers have harnessed for their own purposes
and that have divided union members by class as well as gender. 2A
Thus, the greatest danger is not that comparable worth will prove too
radical, but rather that it will not prove radical enough. Once again, if the
problem is too narrowly defined, concerns about gender could displace concerns
about class, race, and ethnicity. The result may be a slightly modified compen-
sation structure in which the "haves" still come out far ahead, although more
women are among them. By cloaking job evaluation in a mantle of seemingly
246. To assess intrinsic worth, decisionmakers typically determine a priori the weight of factors that
should serve as the basis for salary differentials. Experts will rank job characteristics such as skill,
responsibility, and working conditions, and then assign points to particular jobs based on their weighted
characteristics. Compensation levels can then be readjusted to assure parity between jobs with similar ratings.
The strengths of this system also establish its limitations. By rating jobs without regard to existing pay rates,
such techniques often expose underpayment of predominantly female occupations. Yet, how much weight
should attach to particular characteristics, and how particular jobs should be rated in terms of those
characteristics, are judgments about which experts often disagree. Courts have no principled basis for
resolving such disputes and litigation is an expensive and often ineffective forum for representing all relevant
perspectives. See sources cited in E. PAUL, EQUITY AND GENDER: THE COMPARABLE WORTH DEBATE 55-56
(1989) (noting disparities in evaluation of similar positions by different state governments); Rhode, supra
note 141, at 1230-39.
247. Under policy-capturing evaluation systems, the relative worth of particular job characteristics is
determined by analysis of existing wage rates. Experts use statistical regression techniques to establish the
relative weight of factors in predicting correct wages. Those wage rates are then reexamined to determine
whether employers have consistently employed their own weighting system across job categories-irrespec-
tive of the race, gender, and ethnicity of employees and the pay at which they are willing to work. The
strengths of this system also impose its limitations. By relying on the employer's own standards to establish
relative worth, policy-capturing approaches avoid more divisive issues about the intrinsic value of particular
jobs. Such approaches have revealed racial and gender biases, and could be the basis of legal liability. See,
e.g., THE WAGE GAP, supra note 4, at 86-104; Clauss, supra note 243, at 52-54; Rhode, supra note 141,
at 1228-40. However, since a policy-capturing approach uses existing wage rates to assess the relative
importance of job characteristics, it will also reflect the undervaluation that has historically affected female-
and minority-dominated jobs. A more fundamental challenge to current norms is possible with apriori job
evaluation techniques that focus on intrinsic worth, implemented through legislative and collective bargaining
initiatives and involving workers in the evaluative process. See supra note 246.
248. For example, in both Minnesota and Oregon, implementation at the local level left workers
confused and divided. Many managers found ways to use job evaluation to redistribute rather than augment
salary levels and to weaken the collective bargaining process. J. ACKER, supra note 241, at 100-43, 167-69,
200-07; Evans & Nelson, Comparable Worth: The Paradox of Technical Reform, 96 FEftINST STUD. 171,
180-86 (1989).
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scientific objectivity, incremental reforms can insulate wage hierarchies from
more searching review. 9
A more hopeful alternative is that feminism will broaden understandings
of the problem to be addressed. At issue is not simply gender equality, but also
social priorities. How much disparity across salary levels is essential to promote
workplace efficiency? Are we comfortable with a society that pays more for
parking lot attendants than childcare attendants, whatever the male/female
composition of those jobs? By making these questions visible and forcing them
onto legislative and collective bargaining agendas, the pay equity campaign
could promote progress for all subordinated groups. In that sense, comparable
worth could be a radical concept, but not in the sense critics usually claim. It
need not imply a centrally planned economy, but it can invite us to rethink the
alternatives.
C. Resisting Alternatives
A final, and in many ways the most debilitating, form of denial is to
acknowledge gender inequality as a problem but to resist the possibility of
solution. This strategy, which operates at individual, institutional, and societal
levels, typically concedes feminist premises while dismissing feminist res-
ponses. The effect is to preempt debate by recasting its terms. Sex-based
injustice becomes one more lamentable but inevitable fact of life. And as then-
President Carter once explained in justifying the denial of federal abortion
assistance to impoverished women: "[T]here are many things in life that are
not fair." 0
1. Individual Responses
At the individual level, a common strategy of resistance is to invoke cultural
determinism. Men who grew up under traditional norms are often presumed to
be incapable of change. Explanations that would be viewed unacceptable in
contexts of race pass without objection in contexts of gender. If men are not
comfortable working with or for women, or doing "women's work" around the
house, it's a regrettable byproduct of our sexist culture. As one of the husbands
in the Hochschild-Machung study explained, he needed someone to take care
249. J. ACKER, supra note 241, at 100-0 1, 167-69, 202,208-12; Brenner, Feminist Political Discourses:
Radical Versus Liberal Approaches to the Feminization of Poverty and Comparable Worth, 1 GENDER &
Soc'Y 447 (1987). In relying on evaluation systems to give legitimacy and an "aura of objectivity" to their
claims, but then losing control over the design or choice of such systems, pay equity proponents have been
caught in no-win situations. To achieve some tangible gains and to avoid losing face, proponents have had
to accept evaluation frameworks that incorporate bias, reinforce wage hierarchies, and solidify managerial
power. See Steinberg, Job Evaluation and Managerial Control: The Politics of Technique and the Techniques
of Politics (May 1990) (unpublished manuscript).
250. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1016 n.219 (quoting President
Jimmy Carter, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1977, at AlO, col. 4).
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of "[my] MCP [male chauvinist pig] needs-which I can't help having growing
up in this kind of society."' t
A second line of defense is to take men's aspirations and constraints as
given, while assuming women's are negotiable. Husbands who won't reduce
their workplace obligations to accommodate family responsibilities frequently
develop such selective perception. For them, to make career concessions is
simply not an option. This perspective denies the role of choice even as it is
exercised. In the view of many professionals: "It's not a question of what I
want. ' 2 2 After all, a "demanding practice is a demanding practice."
3
2. Institutional Responses
Similar perceptions operate at the institutional level as well. Only a small
fraction of American employees have adequate access to childcare assistance,
parental leaves, flexible schedules, or decent part-time work. 4 Such options
are commonly dismissed as unworkable or unaffordable, and the cost of even
relatively minor adjustments often appears prohibitive. The point was recently
illustrated by a law firm associate who returned to full-time work while still
nursing her child. To minimize inconvenience for the firm, she extracted breast
milk with a pump, rather than breastfeed during working hours. This did not
satisfy the finn's partners, one of whom noted that at her billing rates, the milk
she was providing cost $10 per ounce. His message was that perhaps she and
her husband "can afford that, but the firm can't." 5
Such claims build on longstanding ideological traditions. Almost every
major effort to promote gender equality has been painted as economically
unfeasible, and almost no cost has been too trivial to include. The extended
history of the "potty problem" is perhaps the most obvious illustration.
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the absence of
adequate lavatory facilities appeared as an insurmountable obstacle to gender
integration. Institutions including the Yale Medical School, the Princeton
251. As quoted in A. HOCHSCHILD & A. MACHUNG, supra note 80, at 119.
252. Id. at 113.
253. Kerlow, D.C. Firms Exceed Average in Women Partners, Legal Times, Feb. 13, 1989, at 11, col.
4 (quoting June Gertig). As Kerlow's article makes clear, the perspective is not limited to men. And when
women echo the view that professional demands cannot be adjusted to accommodate substantial family
commitments, it encourages the perception that existing norms are gender neutral. Cf. supra text accompany-
ing note 179.
254. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Education and
Labor, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 279 (1988) (testimony of Dr. Heidi Hartmann); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CHILD
CARE: A ,VORKPLACE ISSUE 1-10 (1988); S. KAMERMAN & A. KAHN, THE RESPONSIVE WORKPLACE (1987);
Dowd, supra note 181; Dowd, supra note 181: Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the
Maternity and Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118 (1986); Marx & Seligson, Child Care in the
United States, in THE AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 7, at 132, 143-50; Strober & Dornbusch, Public Policy
Alternatives, in FEMINISM, CHILDREN AND THE NEW FAMILIES 334-41 (S. Dornbusch & M. Strober eds.
1988); Taub, supra note 181.
255. Sylvester, How Firms Cope with Motherhood, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 7, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
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graduate program, the Brooklyn and Bronx bar associations, prominent Wall
Street law firms, and various all-male clubs were unable to circumvent this
obstacle for significant periods 56 As one law firm partner explained to a
female applicant during the 1930's, much as his firm would like to hire her,
the logistical difficulties were simply too great; she couldn't use the attorney's
bathroom, she couldn't be relegated to the secretaries' bathroom, and the firm
couldn't afford to build a new one.57 Variations of the same theme continue
to appear as justifications for all-male associations. As Washington Metropolitan
Club officials regretfully reported, "Much as we love the girls, we just don't
have the lavatory facilities to take care of them."58
The point of such examples is not to encourage denials of another form.
The feminist agenda does entail significant costs, and the financial constraints
facing many organizations cannot be discounted. But too often the calculations
have begun with a skewed balance sheet that fails to take into account the less
visible costs and consequences of current practices. Failure to address gender-
related concerns results in lost talent, heightened turnover, and diminished
productivity in the current labor force, as well as inadequate support for the
children who will shape its future.
3. Societal Responses
Systematic miscalculations are also apparent at the societal level. Adequate
parental leave, childcare, maternal health, birth control, and vocational training
initiatives are typically evaluated in terms of short-run expenditures, which all
too often our nation "cannot" afford. The long-term costs of this judgment are
underestimated or overlooked. Parental leave legislation is a classic example.
In justifying his veto of the proposed Family and Medical Leave Act of 1990,
President Bush expressed concern for the costs to American business in an
"increasingly complex and competitive global marketplace." 9 Yet if we are
to maintain our competitive position, it is critical that we invest now in the
generations that will sustain us later. Experts universally agree that close
attachments to a primary caretaker are critical to early child development. °
Our unwillingness to require even minimal unpaid parental leaves sets us apart
256. C. EPSTEIN, WoMAN'S PLACE: OPTIONS AND LIMITS IN PROFESSIONAL CAREERS 185 (1970); D.
RHODE, supra note 3, at 284-85; Baserga, The Early Years of Coeducation at the Yale University School
of Medicine, 53 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 181 (1980). At the Yale Medical School, the problem was finally
surmounted when the father of a prospective female student donated funds for a ladies' room. Id.
257. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 85.
258. As quoted in Alpern, Clubs: The Ins and Outs, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1977, at 19.
259. 136 CONG. REC. H4451 (July 10, 1990) (statement of President Bush). For similar arguments
against parental leave, see sources cited in D. RHODE, supra note 3, at 356 n.27; Pytte, House Passes
Parental Leave; White House Promises Veto, CONG. Q., May 12, 1990, at 1471 (quoting Rep. Lay's view
that such legislation would provide "another nail in the coffin of competitiveness and productivity").
260. Brazelton, Issues for Working Parents, in THE PARENTAL LEAVE CRISIS: TOWARD A NATIONAL
POLICY 36 (E. Zigler & M. Franke eds. 1988).
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from every western industrialized nation except South Africa. 1 In the long
term, such a policy cannot help but compromise the economic objectives it
purports to serve.
Moreover, calculations that focus only on the costs to business obscure the
costs to vulnerable children, disabled workers, elderly dependents, and their
largely female caretakers. Estimates of the total personal as well as societal
losses resulting from the absence of adequate caretaking structures make clear
the irrationality of current policies.
262
Such denials of collective solutions to gender-related problems reverse one
of feminism's central principles. The effect is to personalize the political and
to miscast individual rights as a substitute for societal initiatives.
V. REFORMULATING THE PROBLEM: REASSESSING THE RESPONSE
For contemporary feminism, these ideologies of denial pose problems on
two levels. The first involves dilemmas of difference: how to affirm sex-linked
attributes without overgeneralizing their content and perpetuating their con-
straints. A second challenge involves political struggle: how to build collective
organizations in an individualistic culture and encourage coalitions among a
diffuse and heterogeneous community.
A. Dilemmas of Difference
1. The Validation of Difference
Throughout its history, the women's movement has attempted to validate
as well as challenge gender differences. The result has been certain predictable
tensions in feminist theory and practice. As previous discussion noted, many
early activists predicated their claims for equality on women's distinctive
nurturing qualities and concerns. In the 1970's and 1980's, similar arguments
gained greater prominence. Increasing numbers of theorists began emphasizing
the centrality of sexual difference although disagreeing about its origins and
consequences. Their discourse reflects a broad range of perspectives that are
difficult to fit under any single label. For present purposes, it is enough to
summarize certain common themes that can be loosely grouped under the term
"relational feminism." 263
What unites these approaches is a focus on women's reproductive role and
the nurturing relationships that it has encouraged. Some feminists attach
261. Pytte, supra note 259, at 1474. For discussion of the inadequacy of current policies, see sources
cited supra notes 177, 181.
262. R. SPALTER-ROTH & H. HARTMANN, UNNECESSARY LOSSES: THE COSTS TO WORKERS IN THE
STATES OF THE LACK OF FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE (1988).
263. See Offen, Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach, 14 SIGNS 119, 134 (1988).
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overarching significance to biological difference.' Others give varying em-
phasis to socialization, role constraints, or subordination; their frameworks
underscore women's need to obtain status, control, and approval through
attachments to others or conformity to existing norms.265 A third approach
draws on psychoanalytic theory. According to this last account, children
develop closer attachments to a primary caretaker of the same sex. Individuals
who form strong attachments in early life will be more likely later to define
themselves in relation to others and to develop close nurturing bonds. Since
most primary caretakers have been and continue to be female, girls grow up
with a greater inclination toward and capacity for caretaking roles.266
A final approach, which has been most influential in legal arenas, focuses
not on the origins of gender difference but on its normative significance. From
this perspective, the problem for contemporary western women stems less from
the exaggeration of difference than from its devaluation. This school of thought,
popularized by Carol Gilligan, argues that conventional moral and legal theories
have placed too great a priority on abstract rights, and too little on concrete
relationships. Based on empirical and qualitative research, Gilligan claims that
women tend to reason in "a different voice," which is especially attentive to
care, cooperation, and context in the resolution of human problems.' Build-
ing on her approach, some feminists suggest that female lawyers bring a
distinctive perspective to legal issues and that greater responsiveness to their
values may foster less adversarial, competitive, and hierarchical legal institu-
tions.2S8
Relational feminism has made important contributions, but as subsequent
discussion suggests, they have come at a substantial cost. Its strengths lie in
its demand that the values traditionally associated with women be valued, and
that legal strategies focus on transforming social institutions, rather than just
assimilating women within them. By affirming characteristics conventionally
associated with women, such approaches can encourage greater political
cohesiveness and collective self-esteem. Relational feminism can also provide
264. See, e.g., C. DUCHEN, FEMINISM IN FRANCE (1986); T. MoI, SExUAL/rExTUAL POLITICS: FEMINIST
LITERARY THEORY (1985); NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS: AN ANTHOLOGY (E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds.
1980); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988).
265. See Dubois, Dunlap, MacKinnon, Gilligan& Menkel-Meadow, Feminist DiscourseMoral Values,
and the Law: A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REv. 11, 74 (1985) [hereinafter Feminist Discourse]
(comments of Catharine MacKinnon, emphasizing subordination); Macoby, Gender and Relationships: A
DevelopmentalAccount, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 513,516-19 (1990) (emphasizing peer group socialization).
266. Chodorow, Psychoanalytic Feminism and the Psychoanalytic in Psychology of Women, in
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 38, at 114. See generally N. CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF
MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978); D. DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID
AND THE MINOTAUR: SEXUAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE HUMAN MALAISE (1976).
267. C. GILLIGAN, supra note 10.
268. See generally R. JACK & D. JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS (1989); Bender,
From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and the Ethic of Care in Law, 15
VT. L. REV. 1 (1990); Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, I BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 580-616 (1986).
17851991]
The Yale Law Journal
theoretical underpinnings for policies that are responsive to women's particular
concerns.
2. Contextual Critiques
Yet as was true during earlier feminist campaigns, this validation of differ-
ence raises its own set of problems at both strategic and substantive levels. As
a strategic matter, affirmation of women's voice can deflect attention from the
structural factors that construct and constrain it.269 Emphasizing male's associ-
ation with abstract rationality and females' concern with interpersonal relation-
ships reinforces longstanding stereotypes that have restricted opportunities for
both sexes. However feminist in inspiration, any dualistic world view is likely
to be appropriated for nonfeminist objectives. As the previous discussion
reflects, women's caretaking priorities have served to justify their
underrepresentation in demanding positions and to reinforce roles that are more
separate than equal. Employer policies providing maternal but not parental
leaves risk recreating the adverse consequences of protective labor legislation.
Such policies encourage perceptions that nurturance is a distinctively female
concern and legitimate "mommy tracks" that often become "mommy
traps."270
Moreover, as a substantive matter, it is by no means clear how different
women's "different" voice is. Relational feminist work has generally failed to
address variations across culture, class, race, ethnicity, age, and sexual orienta-
tion."' For example, Gilligan's data drew on small unrepresentative samples,
and most empirical studies of moral development do not disclose significant
gender distinctions.272 Nor does related research on managerial and political
269. See Hare-Mustin & Maracek, Gender Meaning and the Meaning of Difference: Postmodernism
and Psychology, in MAKING A DIFFERENCE, supra note 73, at 22, 52; see also Feminist Discourse, supra
note 265, at 74 (comments of Catharine MacKinnon, claiming that the voice Gilligan describes is the voice
of victims).
270. Couric, Women in the Large Firms: A High Price of Admission?, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 11, 1989, at
S2 (overwhelming majority of female attorneys feel taking part-time or flexible-time schedule would be
serious career impediment); Kingson, supra note 175.
271. Fraser & Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and
Postmodernism, in FEMINSI /POSTMODERNISM 19 (L. Nicholson ed. 1990); Stacey & Thorne, The Missing
Feminist Revolution in Sociology, 32 Soc. PROBs. 301 (1985). See generally sources cited infra note 272.
272. For critiques of Gilligan's methodology, see C. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 76-94; Benhabib, The
Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Feminist Theory, in FEMINISM
AS CRITIQUE: ESSAYS ON THE POLMCS OF GENDER IN LATE-CAPITALIST SOCIETIES 77-79 (1987); Colby
& Damon, Listening to a Different Voice: A Review of Gilligan's In a Different Voice, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF WOMEN: ONGOING DEBATES 321 (M. Walsh ed. 1987); Greeno & Maccoby, How Different is the
"Different Voice?," 11 SIGNS 310, 312-16 (1986); see also N. WALSH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 275-
77 (1987) (bibliography). For related criticisms of psychoanalytic theories such as those found in Chodorow
and Dinnerstein's work, see Fraser & Nicholson, supra note 271. The most substantial empirical study
applying Gilligan's framework in law has been a study of 36 Washington state practitioners with relatively
homogeneous backgrounds. See generally R. JACK & D. JACK, supra note 268.
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behavior reveal the kind of strong sex-linked variations that relational feminism
would suggest.27 3
The celebration of difference risks oversimplifying and overclaiming. Recent
research finds few psychological attributes on which the sexes consistently
vary.274 Even for these attributes, such as aggression, spatial ability, and help-
ing behavior, gender typically accounts for only about 5% of the variance; the
similarities between men and women are far greater than the disparities, and
small statistical distinctions do not support sweeping sex-based dichoto-
mies.275 Gender differences fall along a continuum and context matters greatly
in eliciting traits traditionally associated with women.276 When pressures for
sex-typed behavior are strong, individuals generally will behave in expected
ways, which helps transform sex-based stereotypes into self-fulfilling prophe-
sies.277 It is misleading to discuss gender-related attributes as if they can be
abstracted from the distinctive social expectations, opportunities, and hierarchies
that are also linked to gender.278
Such findings suggest reasons to qualify relational claims but not to dismiss
all of their potential implications. Although psychological variations between
the sexes are relatively minor and socially contingent, the variation in their roles
and experience continues to be substantial. As relational feminists have noted,
the fact that men and women give similar answers in most surveys of moral
273. For managerial similarities, see, for example, G. POWELL, supra note 102, at 163-65; C. EPSTEIN,
supra note 9, at 173-84; Forisha, The Inside and the Outsider: Women in Organizations, in OUTSIDER ON
THE INSIDE: WOMEN AND ORGANIZATION (1981); Kanter, The Impact of Hierarchical Structures on the Work
Behavior oflVomen andMen, in WOMEN AND WORK: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 234,236-45 (R. Kahn-
Hut, A. Kaplan Daniels & R. Colvard eds. 1982). But cf. data on managerial differences cited infra notes
280 & 285-86 and accompanying text. For political behavior, see R. ERIKSON, N. LUTrBEG & K. TEDIN,
AMERCAN PUBLIC OPINION: ITS ORIGINS, CONTENT AND IMPACT 186-87 (1980); Jacquette, Introduction
to WOMEN IN POLmCS xiii-xxii (J. Jacquette ed. 1974).
274. A. EAGLY, supra note 102, at 31; Deaux & Kite, Thinking About Gender, in ANALYZING GENDER,
supra note 84, at 93, 94; Hyde, supra note 16, at 64-68; Maccoby, supra note 265, at 513-15; see also E.
MACCOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1974).
275. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 185; Deaux, supra note 104; Deaux & Major, A Social-Psychological
Model of Gender, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIES, supra note 38, at 89.
276. A. EAGLY, supra note 102, at 27-31, 125-32; C. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 185; Deaux & Kite,
supra note 274, at 93, 94; Thorne, Children and Gender: Constructions of Difference, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 38, at 100; see also R. KANTER, supra note 129, at 206-10 (suggesting that once
women reach critical mass, adverse effects of tokenism and role stereotyping substantially decline); Riesman,
Intimate Relationships from a Microstructural Perspective: Men Who Mother, 1 GENDER & SOC'Y 1, 21-23
(1987) (finding that men's involuntary assumption of primary parental role was at least as powerful as sex
in predicting "feminine" traits and nurturing behavior); Spangler, Gordon & Pipkin, Token Women, An
Empirical Test of Kanter's Hypothesis, 84 AM. L SOC. 160 (1978) (discussing ratio of minority to majority
as it affects achievement).
277. Unger, ImperfectReflectionsofReality: Psychology Constructs Gender, in MAKING A DIFFERENCE,
supra note 73, at 102, 106.
278. Lott, Dual Natures or Learned Behavior: The Challenge to Feminist Psychology, in MAKING A
DIFFERENCE, supra note 73, at 65, 70 (if averaged differences between women and men are attributed to
gender rather than to different experiences correlated with gender, description is confused with explanation).
For an elaboration of women's difference in experiential rather than essential terms, see Fineman, Challeng-
ing Laws, Establishing Differences: The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 U. FLA. L. REV. 21, 37
(1989); Williams, supra note 189; sources cited hifa notes 289 & 293.
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reasoning does not mean that they would choose similar ways of framing the
question. 79 Nor is it clear that most women would structure workplace policy,
managerial norms, or legal practice in the same way as men if given greater
decisionmaking opportunities.80 Women's distinctive biological capacities
and cultural experience are inextricably linked. To make sense of gender
dynamics, we need frameworks that neither overstate nor undervalue gender
difference.
Recent studies involving legal practice offer a case in point. The limited
data available reveal some significant sex-linked differences, but their extent
depends heavily on context. For example, some studies on negotiation have
found that women attach higher importance to social relations, process con-
cerns, and cooperative interaction than do their male counterparts.2 1 By con-
trast, other surveys find that women do not respond differently than men to
common negotiating dilemmas and that both sexes' negotiating styles are quite
variable; individuals' tendencies toward cooperation or aggression depend on
factors such as substantive objectives, power relationships, time constraints, and
the sex of other parties.2 2 So too, surveys of judicial decisionmaking have
reflected no consistent gender differences in areas such as criminal sentences
and women's rights. 3 In contexts presenting less pressure for conformity,
however, significant differences do emerge. Opinion polls find that female
judges are substantially more likely than their male colleagues to perceive
gender bias as a serious problem, and all-female judicial associations display
279. Gilligan, Reply, 11 SIGNS 324, 329-31 (1986).
280. Roesner, Ways Women Lead, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 119, 120 (in certain medium-
sized organizational settings, women leaders are more likely than men to report practicing interactive
leadership, i.e., to share knowledge and power, to encourage participation, and to enhance subordinates'
self-worth); see also infra text accompanying note 285.
281. See, e.g., D. KOLB & G. COOLIDGE, supra note 104, at 6-18; Aries, MalelFemale Interpersonal
Styles in All Male, All Female and Mixed Groups, in BEYOND SEX ROLES 292 (A. Sargent ed. 1977);
Kimmel & Carnevale, Effects of Trust, Aspiration, and Gender on Negotiation Tactics, 38 3. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 9 (1980); Offermann & Schrier, Social Influence Strategies: The Impact of Sex, Role,
and Attitudes Toward Power, 11 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY BULL. 286 (1985).
For reviews of research discussing differences in children's games (play of males is more rule-based
and competitive while that of females is more cooperative and affiliative), see, for example, R. JACK & D.
JACK, supra note 268, at 130-31; Belle, Gender Differences in Children's Social Networks and Supports,
in CHILDREN'S SOCIAL NETWORKS AND SOCIAL SUPPORTS 173 (D. Belle ed. 1989).
282. See, e.g., studies summarized in D. KOLB & G. COOLIDGE, supra note 104, at 6-18; Pruitt,
Carnevale, Forcey & Van Slyck, Gender Effects in Negotiation: Constituent Surveillance and Contentious
Behavior, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 264 (1986); Pruitt & Syna, Mismatching Opponent's
Offers in Negotiation, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 103, 110-12 (1985) (finding women more
likely to exploit weak opponent).
283. Cook, Will Women Judges Make a Difference in Women's Legal Rights? A Prediction from
Attitudes and Simulated Behavior, in WOMEN, POWER AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS 216 (M. Rendel ed. 1981);
Gruhl, Spohn & Welch, Women as Policymakers: The Case of Trial Judges, 25 AM. J. POL. SC. 308 (198 1)
(finding no gender difference except female judges' greater propensity to sentence female offenders to
prison); Kritzer & Uhlman, Sisterhood in the Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case
Disposition, SOC. SCI. J., Apr. 1977, at 77 (finding no gender differences on criminal matters including trial
and sentencing of rape defendants); Walker & Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench: Policy
and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 607 (1985) (finding no significant male/female difference on
issues of criminal law and women's rights).
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greater sensitivity to feminist concerns than do their male-dominated counter-
parts. 14
Other research on organizational behavior also underscores the importance
of context in determining how or whether values traditionally associated with
women will be expressed. Feminist political groups and all-female law firms
generally have established less hierarchical, more participatory relationships
than other comparable institutions.' By contrast, most comparisons of wom-
en and men in typical organizational settings find little or no consistent gender
difference in managerial style. 6 Other empirical work confirms an intuitively
obvious point: male and female employees who confront the same occupational
pressures tend to converge in work-related responses.287 To the extent that
sex-related differences emerge, they appear more related to social expectations
and constraints than to essential attributes.2 8
These varying assessments of difference should come as no surprise in a
culture that sends mixed messages about gender roles. As long as societal
norms both reinforce and devalue attributes traditionally associated with women,
"women's voice" will speak in multiple registers. The objective for contempo-
rary feminists is to develop strategies that neither glorify nor discount differ-
ence, but that challenge its adverse consequences.
284. See studies summarized in Schafran, supra note 167, at 67-69; CAL. JUD. COUNCIL ADVISORY
COMM. ON GENDER BIAS IN CTs., Introduction to ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN
THE COURTS 9 (1990) (63% of female but only 23% of male judges believe gender bias is widespread).
Martha Minow, Carolyn Heilbrun, and Judith Resnik describe a representative example. At a recent
conference of women judges, there was opportunity to do volunteer work at a local soup kitchen and
scheduled discussion on issues such as judicial treatment of rape victims who break down during their
testimony. Heilbrun & Resnik, Convergences: Law, Literature, and Feminism, 99 YALE L.L 1913, 1948
(1989); M. Minow, Illegal Feminism (1990) (unpublished manuscript). For discussion of the National
Association of Women Judges, see Klein, Woman Justice-Does She View the Law Differently?, 26 Cr.
REV. 18, 21-23 (1989). In an earlier draft of this Essay, Cynthia Epstein suggested that this example
attempted to prove too much and carried connotations of"lady bountiful." She quite rightly noted that both
sexes work in programs for low-income communities and that female professionals are rarely regular
volunteers. However, the point of the example is not to make universal claims about women's special
empathy, but rather to suggest that certain social contexts are more apt to evoke it, and that a variety of
cultural forces make all-female associations likely to express different concerns than male-dominated
organizations.
285. C. EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 130-61; Martin, Rethinking Feminist Organizations, 4 GENDER &
SOc'Y 182 (1990) (discussing research finding that women's political organizations are more participatory
and less hierarchical than other comparable organizations).
286. Most studies find no differences and conclude that organizational selection and socialization
processes work against stereotypical behavior. See sources cited supra notes 273 & 276. A recent meta-anal-
yss of prior work suggests that female leadership tends to be slightly more interpersonally oriented and
less autocratic however, and speculates that these traits may be in part attributable to the less supportive
atmosphere that female managers often face. Skepticism about women's ability may induce them to engage
in more participatory collaborative processes. Eagly & Johnson, Gender and Leadership Style: A Meta-
Analysis, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 233, 235, 242-48 (1990); see also note 280.
287. P. ENGLAND & G. FARKAS, supra note 202, at 137-41 (research suggesting individuals develop
psychological styles required to survive in structural position they hold); Gomez-Mejia, Sex Differences
During Occupational Socialization, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 492, 495 (1983); see also K. FERGUSON, THE
FEMINIST CASE AGAINST BUREAUCRACY 94 (1984); G. POWELL, supra note 102, at 179-81; C. EPSTEIN,
supra note 9, at 179-81.
288. See supra notes 275-78 & 286 and accompanying text.
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Reformulating the problem in these terms builds on a second strain of
contemporary feminist theory, one concerned not simply with women's differ-
ences from men but also with women's differences from each other.
Postmodern theoretical accounts have drawn increasing attention to the multiple
forces that constitute women's identity across race, ethnicity, class, age, reli-
gion, sexual orientation, and so forth. 9 Yet this focus has also underscored
a longstanding paradox in feminist theory and practice. What gives feminism
its unique perspective is its claim to speak from women's experience. But that
same experience counsels attention to the differences in women's backgrounds,
perceptions, and priorities. There is no "generic woman," nor any monolithic
"woman's point of view.""29 Feminism has increasingly become "feminisms,"
which complicates the search for theoretical coherence and political cohe-
sion.291
Yet the factors that divide feminists could also be a basis for enriching anal-
ysis and broadening coalitions. As Audre Lorde has noted, it is not "our
differences which separate [us as] women, but our reluctance to recognize those
differences and to deal effectively with the distortions which have result-
ed."292 The same values that underpin feminism's struggle against gender
inequality demand its opposition to other forms of subordination. We cannot
empower all women without challenging the multiple sources of
disempowerment that many women face. The problem is how to make such
challenges a basis for psychological affinity and political activism.
To realize its full potential, the feminist movement must both expand its
practical agenda and qualify its theoretical claims. No single categorical frame-.
work can adequately address the dynamics of difference. We remain caught
between the need to affirm our gender identity and to challenge its constraints,
to claim solidarity and to acknowledge diversity. The sameness/difference
dilemma cannot be resolved; it can only be reformulated. Our focus needs to
289. Di Stefano, Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity, and Postmodernism, in FEMI-
NISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 271, at 63, 73; Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist
Theory, 12 SIGNS 621,634-39 (1987); Gagnier, Feminist Postmodernism: The End of Feminism or the Ends
of Theory?, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 38, at 23-26; and sources cited infra notes 290-92.
290. E. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 114, 167
(1988); Rhode, The Woman's Point of View, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 39, 41, 44 (1988). On the failure of much
feminist jurisprudence to take adequate account of diversity, see Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L.
REV. 539,539-46; Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L REV. 581,585-608
(1990); Kline, Race, Racism, and Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARv. WOMEN'S L.L 115, 121 (1989).
291. A. RICH, Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism, Racism, Gynephobia, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND
SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE, 1966-1978, at 275, 299 (1979); Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-
Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS 405, 406 (1988); Bordo, Feminism,
Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM, supra note 271, at 133, 134-42;
Harding, The Instability of the Analytic Categories of Feminist Theory, 11 SIGNS 645 (1986); Keller, Holding
the Center of Feminist Theory, 12 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 313, 314 (1989).
292. A. LORDE, Age, Race, Class, and Sex: Women Redefining Difference, in SISTER OUTSIDER 114,
122 (1984). On the need for "multiple consciousness," see Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple
Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7, 9 (1989).
1790 [Vol. 100: 1731
Feminist Challenges
shift from differences to disadvantage and to the social conditions that perpetu-
ate it.293
To make significant progress, our strategies must rest on feminist principles,
not feminine stereotypes. The issues of greatest concern to women are not
simply "women's issues." Although the feminist platform incorporates values
traditionally associated with women, the stakes in its realization are ones that
both sexes share.
B. Individual Premises and Social Priorities
A related and equally longstanding challenge is how to make this feminist
agenda a matter of personal as well as collective responsibility. As historical
and social science research make clear, a sense of injustice is necessary but not
sufficient to provoke resistance. The distribution of resources for collective
mobilization is equally critical.2' Women's access to such resources has been
constrained by their disproportionate assumption of domestic burdens and their
disproportionate concentration among the poor. Moreover, women constitute
a dispersed and heterogeneous group, which heightens the barriers to effective
organization. 95 The guarantees of equality in formal treatment that have been
able to secure consensus have been unable to ensure equality in social experi-
ence. Women's most fundamental problem is how to politicize the prob-
lem-how to increase a sense of shared identity, purpose, and power through
collective action.
1. Cultural Assumptions
This problem is compounded by the individualist ethic that dominates
American public discourse. Issues of group equality are often translated into
matters of individual opportunity, and shared needs are left to private solutions.
Barbara Bush's admonition to the 1990 Wellesley graduating class typifies
current wisdom: "Your success as a family, our success as a society, depends
293. C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINISTTHEORY OFTHE STATE 117-25, 180-88,306-13; D. RHODE,
supra note 3. For an account of "relational" frameworks that focus on the construction and consequences
of difference, see M. MINOW, supra note 190, at 41-42, 56-60, 217-19, 375-77. For accounts of the role
of practical reasoning in this effort, see generally Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829
(1990); Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1669 (1990).
294. See F. CROSBY, supra note 208, at 22; C. TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 54-57,
83-84 (1978). In one representative study, the magnitude of female employees' feelings of deprivation had
no significant effect on their willingness to engage in collective responses; the determining factors were
the availability of resources and personal risks associated with organized action. Martin, supra note 219,
at 217, 232; see also Martin, Brickman & Murray, Moral Outrage and Pragmatism: Explanations for
Collective Action, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 484, 486 (1984).
295. For barriers to organizing diffuse groups, see W. GAMSON, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL PROTEST
(1975); C. TILLY, supra note 294, at 83-84; Hochschild, supra note 213, at 195. For successful grassroots
efforts, see A. BOOKMAN & S. MORGEN, WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1988).
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not on what happens in the White House but on what happens inside your
house."296
The popular media offer variations on a similar theme. The feminist mes-
sage, as repackaged for mass consumption, often carries a distinctly unfeminist
undertone. Women's liberation reportedly lies in self-improvement, not social
activism. Celebrated best-sellers offer cautionary tales of both success and
failure, but their underlying message is much the same. Whether the topic is
supermoms and how they manage, or Women Who Can't Say No and the Men
Who Control Them, the moral is that solutions for women's problems lie with
individual women.2 97 It is just a matter of choosing the right man, the right
wardrobe, the right career sequence, or the right time-management techniques.
"Political correctness" has become more a matter of self-presentation than
social activism. Feminism's emphasis on self-transformation as a prelude to
political change is being replaced with a focus on self-transformation as a
substitute for political change.2 98
The implications of this ideology were evident in Ruth Sidel's recent study
of aspirations among young women. Cutting across boundaries of race, class,
and ethnicity was a shared myth: that women can "have it all" without the
support of an extended family, a community, or the state.299 The "all" is not
a modest vision. Nor for most of these women is it a remotely realistic one.
What they expect is a successful career, happy marriage, well-adjusted children,
and plenty of money; what they lack is any appreciation of the broader societal
changes that such a vision would require."
For too many women, feminism is everywhere and nowhere. Its insistence
on individual opportunity is widely shared while its call to common action is
widely ignored. The women's movement has increased aspirations to gender
equality but not the collective commitment necessary to realize them. A per-
spective so self-absorbed is ultimately self-defeating. We cannot expect that
individual solutions will prove adequate to meet societal problems. Ironically
enough, it was Raisa Gorbachev's Wellesley comments that identified
296. Text of Mrs. Bush's Speech, Wash. Post, June 2, 1990, at C4, col. 1.
297. Representative examples include: C. COWAN & M. KINDER, SMART WOMEN, FOOLISH CHOICES:
FINDING THE RIGHT MEN AND AVOIDING THE WRONG ONES (1985); K. LEMAN, THE PLEASERS: WOMEN
WHO CAN'T SAY NO AND THE MEN WHO CONTROL THEM (1987); R. NORWOOD, WOMEN WHO LOVE TOO
MUCH: WHEN YOU KEEP WISHING AND HOPING HE'LL CHANGE (1985). For critiques of this genre, see
R. SIDEL, ON HER OWN: GROWING UP IN THE SHADOW OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 156-57, 251 (1990);
Lerner, Problems for Profit?, WOMEN'S REV. BOOKS, Apr. 1990, at 15, 16.
298. Kauffman, The Anti-Politics of Identity, SOCIALIST r.EV., Jan.-Mar. 1990, at 67, 77-78; see also
Ehrenreich, The Women's Movements: Feminist and Antifeminist, RADICAL Am., spring 1981, at 93, 97
(discussing media's transformation of feminism from social movement into self-improvement program for
upwardly mobile women); Epstein, Rethinking Social Movement Theory, SOCIALIST REV., Jan.-Mar. 1990,
at 35.
299. See R. SIDEL, supra note 297, at 9, 29. Although Sidel found certain class-based differences,
virtually all the women in her study shared individualist premises. Id. at 226.
300. Id. at 15-35; see also I. CHAFETZ supra note 9, at 212; Boneparth, Introduction: A Framework
for Policy Analysis, in WOMEN, POWER, AND POLICY, supra note 39, at 1; Ehrenreich, supra note 298, at
98.
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America's current impasse: "At this juncture, each of us looks for her own
solution to the problem. This is one of the problems society ha[s] to deal
with." 301
2. Collective Aspirations
That point is gaining wider recognition, in part because of opportunities like
the symposium that prompted these comments. The importance of such occa-
sions should not be taken for granted. Throughout most of this nation's history,
the advice to professional women has generally been to avoid "women's
issues." For female attorneys, the prevailing wisdom has been never to "take
sex into practice." 302 Over the last two decades, however, these attitudes have
begun to change. The growth in women's professional and political organi-
zations, in grass-roots campaigns and gender bias commissions, and in feminist
scholarship and symposia, all testify to the distance we have traveled. The chal-
lenge remaining is to act on the possibilities they offer.
To that end, our focus must shift from formal opportunity to the social
forces that construct and constrain it. Our analysis of sex-based difference must
become less categorical and more contextual. Our objectives must center on
transforming current power structures as well as enlarging women's place
within them. Finally, and most importantly, our aspirations must include a
broader understanding of "the problem" and of the strategies most likely to
politicize it. A half-century ago, speaking before an audience of women profes-
sionals, Virginia Woolf observed that their access to such occupations for the
first time in history was an event of "extraordinary interest and importance."
Yet although their paths were "nominally open," hidden obstacles remained:
You have won rooms of your own in the house hitherto exclusively
owned by men. You are able, though not without great labour and
effort, to pay the rent .... But this freedom is only a beginning; the
room is your own, but it is still bare .... How are you going to furnish
it, how are you going to decorate it? With whom are you going to share
it, and upon what terms? These, I think are questions of the utmost
importance and interest. For the first time in history you are able to ask
them . . . [and] to decide for yourselves what the answers should
be.303
These remain the questions that define our problem and our challenge.
301. As quoted in Butterfield, Family First, Mrs. Bush Tells Friend and Foe at Wellesley, N.Y. Times,
June 2, 1990, at 1, col. 4, 5, col. 1.
302. N. COT, supra note 55, at 232 (emphasis omitted).
303. V. WOOLF, Professions for Women, in THE DEATH OF THE MOTH 235, 242 (1942), reprinted in
V. WOOLF, WOMEN AND WRITING 57, 63 (M. Barrett ed. 1979).
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